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Foreword 
 
The record decline of over 9% in Irish GDP in 2009 provides the backdrop to 
this important study. Government expenditure has grown rapidly in the Celtic 
Tiger era without much evidence of a value for money culture in any area of 
public spending. Unsustainable borrowing and tax increases postpone only 
briefly the need for better appraisals of public policies and spending in 
Ireland. Education is the first area of public spending to be studied through 
the generosity of the FBD Trust in this series.  
 
I thank the Trust for their support for public policy research in economics in 
our universities. It is vital that research in economics does not become a 
state monopoly. I thank the authors for their dedication and commitment to 
the project. 
 
 
Dr Sean Barrett, FTCD. 
Academic Adviser. 
FBD Trust  
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Opening Statement 
 
A brief essay1 on education policy and innovation would typically begin with a 
discussion of the profundity of change taking place in the structures of the world 
economy. When this project was first proposed at the end of 2007 the world was in 
an economic slowdown but had yet to experience the consequences of the fall of 
Lehman Brothers and near collapse of the global financial system and the 
subsequent acute economic contraction. Ireland, for domestic reasons, had already 
begun to experience a strong economic downturn partly as a result of the 
construction/housing bubble busting (it also included a large element of Ireland's 
loss of competitiveness). The general milieu of solutions and ideas from the media 
and the government focused on the new “smart economy” embodied by the Strategy 
for Science Technology and Innovation (2006) and the Building Ireland's Smart 
Economy: A framework for sustainable economic renewal (2008). Unfortunately, 
much of the policy discussion has not focused enough on the events that were at 
hand, resulting in two policy design failures. First, a lack of the appreciation of the 
role of risk and uncertainty has brought about a near financial armageddon and, 
second, a lack of perspective on how innovation and technology strategies have been 
created in other countries and the importance of institutional and legal structures in 
                                                 
1
 This essay is not an academic publication. Therefore it will not contain the careful citations 
that scholars have come to expect. It does, however, contain an extensive bibliography. 
The views expressed in this essay are those of authors and not of their respective 
departments or institutions. Further clarifications and explanations may be sought by 
contacting the authors.  Charles Larkin of the Department of Economics, Trinity College 
Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland is the corresponding author.  
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fostering economic activity and innovation.  
 
An easy source of insight into the identification and solutions to both of these 
failures can be found in the work of John Maynard Keynes, who has recently 
regained his status as perhaps the most influential economic theorist. His General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) is resurgent as a font of wisdom 
on how to remedy the current malaise of market economics. Chapter 12 of his 
magnum opus offers two important insights to the policymaker. Uncertainty and risk 
are given a through analysis by Keynes, and the entirety of that volume can be seen 
as a continuation of his larger exposition on risk, uncertainty and the power of 
human prediction. In addition, Chapter 12 offers insights from the mercantilist 
authors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, drawing heavily on the work of 
Eli Heckscher and his Mercantilism (1935). Heckscher and members of the 
economic schools of thought respectively known as Historicists (Continental Europe 
in general and Germany in particular) and the Institutionalists (the United States and 
Ireland) provide the raison d'être for national interventions and the explanations for 
the creation and sustained influence of the institutional structures on how economies 
behave. Though these schools are now largely defunct they have left a lasting 
theoretical legacy: the concept of human capital. This concept has existed since the 
origins of economics but was given form by an Irish economist, John Kells Ingram, 
in the mid-nineteenth century, subsequently expanded on and developed by Richard 
T. Ely, John R. Commons and Theodore Schultz in the first half of the twentieth 
century before being systematized by Gary Becker, Edmund Phelps and Robert 
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Lucas in the 1960s and 70s.  
 
It may come as a surprise to many but the so-called “smart economy” or “knowledge 
economy” or “technopolis economy” are actually very old ideas wrapped in rather 
new and shiny packaging. The concept of the concerted effort on the part of the State 
to encourage and design an economy that would return higher economic growth 
rates and improve standards of living  dates back to Early-Modern Europe and if one 
were to conduct more systematic research, one could undoubtedly find examples 
that date back even further. What many consider to be “novel” is the link between 
education and innovation. This is a tried and true model of economic development. 
One must only visit the old capital and trading cities of Europe and see the names of 
streets and districts to see clear examples of how rulers saw what is now referred to 
as human capital as the engine of economic activity. Modern innovation policies and 
their complementary education policies are the successor movements to these State-
driven economic movements of the past. Were they successful? In some cases yes. 
Prussian industrial policy and education structures were very successful but placed 
considerable political strain on existing institutions and may not have been possible 
without the tabula rasa provided by the destruction of universities and social 
structures during the Napoleonic Wars. In some cases they worked for a brief period 
of time, as was the case in Sweden. In some states it resulted in the primacy of 
goods dependent on state patronage, as in Colbert's Goeblins tapestry factory. Other 
states, most notably the United States, engaged in a de facto two region policy with 
an industrial North and agrarian South that eventually amplified political fractures 
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but also gave rise to a powerful system of general education. England also fostered 
innovation and the importation of persons with high levels of human capital but 
imposed draconian export and movement limitations on machine tools and those 
with industrial know-how. Other states systematically engaged in the art of rent-
seeking embodied in the term rentenier. Even the mighty Dutch Empire put away its 
enterprising ways and went to work on manipulating bureaucratic structures to the 
best ends of an individual or vested interest group. Is there any common ground in 
all of these models, beyond that they constituted an aspect of the “economics of 
statemaking” as Gustav Schmoller referred to it? Are similar innovation policies 
today merely the acceptable face of mercantilism in our time?  
 
Can one equate innovation policy with mercantilism in the first place?  Mercantilism 
is the philosophy of a system of economic policy whereby a state attempts to gain 
economic advantage and garner subsequent income gains. In the past this was 
related to the economics of protectionism and the subsequent trade negotiations by 
alternative methods that turned the seventeenth century into the century of war. The 
later view was that this was the economics of statemaking, whereby emergent states 
fostered industries and through a policy of state-enforced asceticism engaged in an 
export-led strategy for economic growth where a constant positive balance-of-trade 
and subsequently balance-of-payments were the objectives. The current policy of 
innovation is to enable countries, especially small open economies like Ireland, to 
engage in an advantageous export-led growth strategy. European Union policy is to 
attract back scholars and researchers from the United States with labs, salaries and 
 9
legal structures, such as the Blue Card, that will enable them and their families to 
work and live within the European Union with ease. This is a policy in direct 
competition with the United States, Japan and the newly industrializing countries of 
the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India & China). The efficacy of this programme of 
government is measured by number of patents issued, gross expenditure on research 
and development, numbers of doctoral-level researchers and the inflow and retention 
of researchers within the Europe Union. Research and development and subsequent 
marketable innovations that it is is hoped it begets will be at the core of Europe's 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This is also the policy of the 
United States, China, Russia, Japan, Korea and most other non-European OECD 
countries. The policy that has been embraced by the G20 group of nations has been 
to address global imbalances, which partly placed export led recoveries at the heart 
of national economic policies. The problem is that this plan of action is seen within a 
zero-sum framework by many nations and the beginnings of protectionism in its 
classic form have begun to be emerge.  
 
States raced against one another for trade routes in the past eventually embracing 
free trade in all things but engineering skill and materials. Technologies eventually 
diffused and the late nineteenth century, despite all its globalization, gave way to the 
naval contests determined as much by human capital inventing steam turbine 
propulsion as by the blood and iron, coal and steel that filled so many volumes on 
military science and political economy at the time. Vannevar Bush, former adviser to 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his Science – the Endless Frontier (1945) 
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and Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in the 
Preserving of Democracy (1949) made the case for extensive state support for higher 
education and innovation as not being a matter of economic importance but key to 
defeating the growing Soviet Empire. The American innovation machine was a 
creation of strategic concern supported by an influx of human capital from Europe 
(the place of origin of most Nobel Prize winners prior to the 1960s) both ante-
bellum and immediately post-bellum. Policies of strategic secrecy, export bans and 
the limited commercial and academic interaction between East and West further 
reinforced mercantilist policies of innovation.  The current phase of competition has 
been placed in the area of human capital and innovation where Ph.D.s per 1000 
inhabitants and patents filed vie to become the new missile gap. To further 
complicate this discussion the gap that exists between the two cultures of science 
and humanities has not been bridged successfully, resulting in a debilitating lack of 
engagement by either group fulfilling C.P. Snow's fears of a rift within the academy 
characterized by debate fueled by hearsay and ignorance. The Snow's Rede Lecture 
at the University of Cambridge in May 1959 was a declaration of the debilitating 
effects of the pigeon-holing of various academic disciplines which resulted in a clear 
delineation between science and the “literary arts”. This was partly a function of the 
linguistic limitations and social selection of what defined science in the Anglo 
world, a term in definition and connotation that was much narrower than the German 
idea of Wissenschaft. As education demanded further and further specialization, it 
closed off to the majority the ability to become fluent in the basic foundations and 
linguistic conventions of the different schools resulting in the present lack of 
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interaction between the two cultures, which is no only detrimental to education but 
also to innovation.  
 
In this essay matters of higher education, human capital, innovation policy, 
uncertainty and economic development will be discussed. The objective of this 
exercise is to illustrate that innovation policies are useful but are the product of 
determined public policy that is aimed at the production of new goods and services 
that will generally advance national wealth. Education and the institutions that 
facilitate it are at once wholly part and separate to the execution of any innovation 
programme. This essay will attempt to knit these several aspects together and 
provide a clearer picture of what Ireland must do not only to be successful but also 
to be the sort of cosmopolitan knowledge society it so strongly desires to become.   
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Section 1 
 
 13
Introduction 
 
Key ideas that need to be looked at in this work relate to the development of 
individuals and of the economy in general. The discussion of creating an “innovation 
society” or a “knowledge economy” has been an important part of political discourse 
at national and supranational (i.e. European Union) levels since the early 1990s. The 
rationale behind this project has been the desire to fulfill what is seen as the 
categorical imperative of government – economic growth, and more importantly, the 
jobs that it creates and sustains.   
 
At the core of this model is the “World Class University” (WCU) that acts as the 
source of innovation and economic development. Jamil Salmi of the World Bank 
provides a visual description of what constitutes such an organisation:                       
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Source: Salmi, J. (2009) The Challenge of Establishing World Class Universities. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, p.8. 
 
This work is a combination of two sections, one is a general look at the “innovation-
knowledge economy” and what that means for the economic analysis of labour 
markets. Second is essentially a comprehensive case-study of the Irish experience of 
an adapting education sector contending with entry into an internationally 
competitive environment. The breadth of countries, supranational bodies and other 
actors included in this section are a reflection of the first six words of any economics 
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course taught with respect to Ireland – Ireland is a small open economy.  
Governments, most especially governments that either come from small countries or 
are situated in sub-national entities are acutely aware that good governance is not so 
much the protection of rights or effective legislation but the procurement of 
sustained economic growth and the jobs that economic development supposedly 
ensures.  
 
Education has been considered an important part of this process and it has been 
considered an essential part by economists and policy specialists. Recently, 
policymakers and analysts have forged a direct link between education, economic 
growth, innovation and long-term competitiveness. This education-innovation-
competitiveness mantra has driven much of the policy changes in Ireland since the 
mid-1990s.  The purpose of this section of our work is to first state the theoretical 
foundations of this assertion. We will subsequently challenge these assertions with 
both theoretical constructions at the macro and microeconomic level and accompany 
those theoretical solutions with facts taken from systems where these policies have 
been applied and have largely failed. This debate also is essentially one of accrual of 
personal benefits, which are rival and exclusive; versus economic and social 
benefits, which are by definition, non-rival and non-exclusive.  Education, from the 
point of view of an economist, has public good aspects, most especially at the 
primary and secondary levels, but essentially it is a private good that is subject to 
public provision. This is due to the fact that the majority of the benefits accrued 
through education are enjoyed by the individual. There are several corollaries to this 
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analysis, which will be discussed below. 
 
The Irish higher education context is framed by two crucial legal structures: the 
European Union's Bologna Process and Ireland's 1997 Universities Act. The 1997 
Act makes an explicit statement as to the future of Irish higher education in Sections 
12 & 13: 
 
12.—The objects of a university shall include— 
( a ) to advance knowledge through teaching, 
scholarly research and scientific investigation, 
( b ) to promote learning in its student body and in 
society generally, 
( c ) to promote the cultural and social life of 
society, while fostering and respecting the 
diversity of the university's traditions, 
( d ) to foster a capacity for independent critical 
thinking amongst its students, 
( e ) to promote the official languages of the State, 
with special regard to the preservation, promotion 
and use of the Irish language and the preservation 
and promotion of the distinctive cultures of 
Ireland, 
( f ) to support and contribute to the realisation of 
national economic and social development, 
( g ) to educate, train and retrain higher level 
professional, technical and managerial personnel, 
( h ) to promote the highest standards in, and 
quality of, teaching and research, 
(i) to disseminate the outcomes of its research in 
the general community, 
( j ) to facilitate lifelong learning through the 
provision of adult and continuing education, and 
( k ) to promote gender balance and equality of 
opportunity among students and employees of the 
university. 
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13.—(1) The functions of a university are to do all things necessary or 
expedient in accordance with this Act and its charter, if any, to further 
the objects and development of the university.  
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), a university— 
( a ) shall provide courses of study, conduct examinations and award 
degrees and other qualifications, 
( b ) shall promote and facilitate research, 
( c ) may establish by incorporation in the State or 
elsewhere, or participate in the establishment of, 
such trading, research or other corporations as it 
thinks fit for the purpose of promoting or assisting, 
or in connection with the functions of, the 
university, 
( d ) may collaborate with educational, business, 
professional, trade union, Irish language, cultural, 
artistic, community and other interests, both inside 
and outside the State, to further the objects of the 
university, 
( e ) shall maintain, manage and administer, and 
may dispose of and invest, the property, money, 
assets and rights of the university, 
( f ) may collaborate with graduates, convocations 
of graduates and with associations representing 
graduates of the university both inside and outside 
the State, 
( g ) may purchase or otherwise acquire, hold and 
dispose of land or other property, and 
( h ) may accept gifts of money, land or other 
property on the trusts and conditions, if any, not in 
conflict with this Act, specified by the donor. 
 
 
It is from this limited license that the Irish story of “academic capitalism” begins. 
The mantra of innovation and concepts from endogenous growth models has caused 
some actors within Irish academic and policymaking circles to grouse and others to 
sing songs of praise.  The European Union has categorically stated that the higher 
education sector across the Union is in crisis. In the European Unions Frequently 
Asked Questions: Why European Higher Education Systems Must be Modernised, 
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MEMO/06/190 (10/05/2006) the EU lists a series of discrete problems: 
 
1. European higher education is fragmented and exists without sufficient 
linkages 
2. National regulations are over-detailed, diminishing responsiveness 
3. European universities have a tendency to uniformity that has sequestered 
world-class research and reduced access 
4. Universities are insufficiently prepared for global competition 
5. Funding for universities is far too low  
6. Access to universities is far too low 
 
 
Higher education reform within this context appears to be nothing more than a series 
of changes that are to be made to the system of higher education, but when this is 
placed alongside the statements of the Union on the creation of a European Institute 
for Innovation and Technology and the Lisbon Process Objectives for 2010 which 
will enable Europe to be the most competitive economy in the world with a focus on 
information communication technology (ICT) and 70% of the working-age 
population in employment. The universities and the education system in general are 
saddled with the duty and obligation to assist the state (in the national and 
supranational sense) to achieve these objectives.   
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Section 2 
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Pre-Third Level Education in Ireland 
The Departments of Education and Science (DES) mission statement states: 
 
The mission of the Department of Education and Science is to provide 
high-quality education, which will:  
• Enable individuals to achieve their full 
potential and to participate fully as members of society,  
and  
• Contribute to Ireland’s social, cultural 
and economic development.2 
 
 
The primary objective of education within this context is first for social capital 
development but also explicitly for human capital development that would enable 
students to enter and perform in the labour market. The Irish government’s white 
paper on education Charting our Education Future echoes these sentiments: 
 
The State’s role in education arises as part of its overall concern to achieve 
economic prosperity, social well-being and a good quality of life within a 
democratically structured society.3  
 
 
Pre-school Education 
 
Pre-school education in Ireland is mainly carried out by private individuals, local 
councils or grant assisted voluntary agencies through pre-schools, play groups, day 
nurseries or crèches. These pre-schools come under the regulation of the Health 
Service Executive. The DES run some specific pre-school projects including the 
Early start programme and the Rutland Street pre school project which specifically 
                                                 
2
 Government of Ireland, 2005, p.6 
3
 Charting our Education Future. pp. 6. 
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target disadvantaged areas. At present the primary schools cater for much of the 
early education (0-6 years) provision. In The DES Annual Report of 2006 it was 
noted that almost half of four year olds and all (99.9%) of five year olds in the 
country were enrolled in the primary school.4  
 
First Level Education 
 
Although many children start aged four in the Irish primary school the compulsory 
starting school age is six years. The DES recorded 3,284 primary schools in Ireland 
in 2006 catering for over 450,000 children countrywide. The average primary school 
involves eight age-grouped classes from junior infants to sixth class (4 to 12 years of 
age).5 The DES state the aims of first level education as:  
 
• to enable the child to live a full life as a child and to realise his 
or her potential as a unique individual  
 
• to enable the child to develop as a social being through living 
and co-operating with others and so contribute to the good of 
society 
 
 • to prepare the child for a continuum of learning. 
 
 
This overall vision is then structured through a process of teaching and learning 
through the primary curriculum. The key subject areas in the curriculum are 
Language; Mathematics; Social, Environment and Scientific Education; Arts 
Education; Physical Education; and Social, Personal and Health Education.  
 
                                                 
4
 Government of Ireland, 2006, p. 11 
5
 Government of Ireland, 2004, p.9 
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The curriculum in Ireland went through radical changes in 1971 where a child-
centered approach replaced a traditional teacher-centered model. A revised primary 
curriculum was put in place in 1999 which similarly endorse this principle and aims 
to “enable children to meet, with self-confidence and assurance, the demands of life, 
both now and in the future”.6 
 
Second Level Education 
 
Second level education in Ireland is quite different in its structures, policy and 
curriculum to first level schools. The government aids 735 second level schools 
(DES statistics section, 2006) in the country and there are approximately 40 private 
non-aided schools. The post-primary sector comprises secondary, vocational, 
community and comprehensive schools. The majority of schools are secondary 
schools which are privately owned and managed, the vast majority by religious 
orders. The teacher salaries however are remunerated by the State as well as the 
State providing for various grants and allowances. Vocational schools are 
administered by Vocational Education Committees (VECs) and almost entirely State 
funded. Community and Comprehensive schools benefit from individual state 
funding and are managed by Boards of Management.  
 
The Department of Education outline the aim of second level education to:  
provide a comprehensive, high-quality learning environment which aims to prepare 
individual students for higher or continuing education or for immediate entry into 
the workplace.7 
                                                 
6
 Government of Ireland, 1999, p.6 
7
 Government of Ireland, 2004, p.13 
 23
The post-primary curriculum is divided between a junior and senior cycle. The 
junior cycle involves a three-year Junior Certificate Programme  (12 – 15 years age 
bracket). The senior cycle is a two-year Leaving Certificate Programme (16 – 18 
years age bracket). The senior cycle may be extended with an optional Transition 
Year Programme taken after the Junior Certificate Programme. This Transition Year 
is interdisciplinary in nature and focuses on self-directed learning.  
 
The senior cycle has experienced significant changes in recent years. There are now 
three programmes in existence, each leading to a State Examination. These are the 
Leaving Certificate, the Leaving Certificate Vocational Programme (LCVP) and the 
Leaving Certificate Applied (LCA). The Leaving Certificate carries a high social 
status in Irish society due to its long established tradition. Students take a minimum 
of five subjects at one of two levels; ordinary and higher. Foundation level is offered 
for Irish and Mathematics. This Certificate acts as the main source of entry to 
universities, institutes of technology and colleges of education through a points 
system linked to grades achieved. 54,000 students took the Leaving Certificate 
examination in 2007.  
 
The Leaving Certificate Vocational Programme (LCVP) was introduced to the senior 
cycle in 1989. The focus is on technical subjects or modules with a vocational focus. 
It gains financial assistance from the European Social Fund. The programmed after 
review was modified in 1994 to broaden the types of subjects taken to include 
Enterprise Education, Preparation for Work and Work Experience. This programme 
is completed alongside a minimum of five other Leaving Certificate subjects.  
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The Leaving Certificate Applied (LCA) Programme was introduced in 1995 and is 
separate from the Leaving Certificate. It is a two-year course which intends to assist 
in the:  
 
Preparation of participants for adult and working life through relevant learning 
experiences, which develop the following areas of human endeavor: spiritual, 
intellectual, social, emotional, aesthetic and physical.8  
 
The programme consists of general education, vocational education and vocational 
preparation. The LCA cannot be used to gain entry to third level education.  
 
Some considerations for pre-Third Level education 
 
It was Lionel Robbins’s (1981) concern, reflecting a little over a decade after the 
commission he chaired brought about widespread changes to the UK higher 
education system, that students were not entering the university system with a broad 
enough education. This was in part a function of the UK A-Levels but also reflects a 
larger specialist models of education delivery that is reinforced in higher education. 
In Ireland, this was never the case but a question can be placed over the efficacy of 
that earlier broad education. Part of the problem relates to the lack of knowledge 
between education levels of what an incoming student's previous academic 
curriculum entailed. Approximately 50% of secondary teachers are unfamiliar with 
the primary curriculum, rendering them poor judges of the skills that students 
                                                 
8
 Government of Ireland, 2004, p.14 
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possess upon entry to second level. More disturbingly the skills that students have 
upon entry to the secondary sector can be considered suspect. This is especial the 
case in the area of mathematics, where 28% of Irish primary school teachers feel 
themselves to be poorly prepared to teach mathematics curriculum. Another problem 
is that the added value of the leaving cert is not clear. ESRI research, for instance, 
shows that mathematics and reading test scores do not significantly change between 
entry to secondary school and the Junior Certificate.  
 
The most common terminal examination and the key to entry into Third Level 
education, the Leaving Certificate Established, is easily open to being “gamed” by 
test takers. Due to the demand driven nature of the examination and conventions 
relating to marking and the determination of examination questions students are 
subject to strong incentives to “get the points”.  This typically manifests itself in 
course selections that are less difficult and memorization. Students become rent-
seekers before they enter university.  University education, like the Irish primary 
school education, is developmental where the students are encouraged to internalise 
skills and learning tools. The current secondary system and the Leaving Certificate 
Established do not encourage this approach to learning.9 As will be discussed below, 
the “knowledge economy” as defined on its own terms,  requires people who are 
versed in Mode 2 knowledge and have the ability to acquire tacit knowledge. The 
                                                 
9
  One of the authors of this report encounters this problem every year in lecturing first year 
Business, Economics and Social Science students in Statistics. These students are typically 
focused on regurgitation, not on the application of deeper knowledge to new problems and 
often lacking basic numerical skills. This, in turn, leads to a lack of confidence in students 
which often causes great deals of stress and anxiety.  
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current secondary system does not encourage the development of those trans- and 
interdisciplinary skills. If the aim of Irish education prior to Third Level is to 
provide the social and human capital to enable an individual to become a participant 
in the modern economy it needs to create willing entrepreneurs and foster 
intellectual flexibility. If one considers the knowledge economy to be a new form of 
mercantilism, then the battleground is not located in the rarefied halls of government 
but in the poorly equipped 24.5:1 classrooms of Ireland.  
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Section 3 
 28
The University in the Society, Polity and Economy 
 
The most common perception of the university is as the place of learning for the 18 
to 25 year-old age cohort with bucolic campuses and woolly-headed professors. The 
image of the university that is seen by modern policymakers and innovation gurus is 
a place somewhat akin to that of the ancient city of Memphis by the Egyptian 
Pharaohs.  Universities have become the center of the knowledge economy, or to be 
more correct, have become the third side of the iron triangle of government and 
industry, in a new form of social partnership, in a world of diminishing union power. 
The universities were capable of performing two essential tasks for the state – one 
was the creation of “innovation”, a catch-all word for the developments that were 
taking place in the advanced economies; the second was the training of new 
members of the labour market that could become the “symbolic analysts” of the 
“new economy”.  This new labour market dynamic was first outlined by Robert 
Reich, who went on to become Secretary of Labor under the Clinton Administration, 
in his book The Work of Nations (1992).  Reich divided the “new economy” into 
three sectors, those providing basic personal services (waiting tables, call centre, 
low-wage jobs), those involved in production (the traditional middle class 
Taylorist/Fordist worker), and the the “symbolic analysts” (doctors, lawyers and 
engineers) that are at the top of the economic hierarchy.  These “symbolic analysts” 
are then divided into two subcategories: national and global. Global members of this 
caste are the persons on a par with Peter Sutherland, global actors that direct 
multinational organisations and firms. The entry criterion to this caste of the 
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symbolic analyst is obtaining a university degree. This brings us back to the first part 
of this discussion, which related to the idea that the university is an essential 
component in the new labour market system. The identified trend, as production jobs 
move to lower-cost centres of production, such as China and India, is that there will 
be low-value-added services jobs and high-value-added “symbolic analysis” jobs, 
which will themselves be stratified by national and global orientations. This, 
combined with the high numbers of nationally-orientated science and engineering 
graduates in China and India, has placed Europe and the United States in a difficult 
position according to Reich, who finds that the expansion of research and 
development facilities and the number of university level graduates as the only 
possibility of preventing the US from loosing competitiveness or creating too large 
an income gap between the internationally competitive symbolic analysts and their 
nationally competitive counterparts.  
 
To look at the question directly. What is the university supposed to “do” to an 
undergraduate? 
 
Goals for individual students 
• Cognitive learning 
• Emotional & Moral development 
• Direct Competence 
• Direct satisfactions and enjoyments from college education. 
• Avoidance of negative outcomes for individual students. 
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Goals for Society 
• Advancement of knowledge 
• Discovery  & encouragement of talent 
• Advancement of social welfare 
• Avoidance of negative outcomes for society 
 
There were several other benefits perceived from attending university: for the state, 
increased tax revenues, greater productivity and increased workforce flexibility with 
private benefits of higher salaries and benefits, higher savings levels and improved 
working conditions. Wider social capital goods were reduced crime rates, increased 
charitable giving/community service and increased quality of civic life. Public health 
benefits were improved health/life expectancy, better consumer decision making and 
increased personal status.10  
 
It appears even on a basic level universities seem to be responsible for fulfilling 
many obligations. A task on a par with the cleansing of the Augean Stables some 
would argue.  To this complex set of economic and social tasks assign the thorny 
political issues of equality of outcome versus equality of opportunity and compound 
that with the issue of university finance.  Universities in the United States and 
Europe opened their doors to new entrants on a scale never thought imaginable. The 
financing of this new desire to bring about a modicum of equality of outcome 
through a large dose of equality of access where in Europe and America the public 
                                                 
10
 Bowen, H. Investment in Learning: The Individual and Social Value of American Higher 
Education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1977. pp. 54-5. 
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purse bore the costs. In the US it was via the G.I. Bill of Rights Act (Serviceman's 
Readjustment Act, 1944) and in Europe as part of a series of social democratic 
policies brought in to solidify the Western European social contract faced with 
rebuilding and the start of the Cold War.  
 
The universities, by the 1970s had benefited greatly from this programme of 
expansion, but the economic realities of the Vietnam War and the first and second 
OPEC shocks, stagflation and high unemployment across Western Europe and the 
United States resulted in harsh financial decisions being made. In the United States, 
easier access to credit allowed the expansion of tuition fees, creating a self-
reinforcing cycle eventually known as the “Chivas Regal Syndrome” where 
institutions competed on the basis of academic reputation and price.  The European 
universities were faced with less flexibility and largely answered resource problems 
with expanding student numbers combined with reduced resources per student.  In 
some Western European countries, the solution has been to reintroduce fees, but on a 
limited and centrally regulated scale. Ireland is unique amongst wealthy nations in 
entering the mass higher education market very late.  
 
The second question is related to the general policy thrust of the HEA, the 
Department of Education and the Department of Enterprise. This policy structure is 
based on the idea that there is a direct causation between the number of scientific 
researchers and economic growth. This model, based on an incremental notion of 
innovation that draws a vague justification from the theories of the Austrian School 
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of Economics (most notably Joseph Schumpeter) is contrary to actual evidence. 
Some of the clearest statements on the extreme risk that this policy option comes 
from the US National Science Foundation which shows that approximately 30% of 
all Ph.D. graduates facing unemployment upon completion, with humanities Ph.D. 
graduates at a rate of unemployment upon completion of 58%. Those who are 
engaged in employment, only 27% are engaged in industry or self-employment, the 
rest working in academic, government or other types of employment.   
 
The levels of investment required to develop a knowledge economy are also 
daunting, and would have appeared so even at the height of the boom.  Ireland 
spends 1.54% of GNP on Gross Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) 
but this metric does not reflect the importance of the general level of investment in 
R&D. For example 1.54% of Irish GNP is still quite small when compared with 
similar proportional expenditure from other EU economies. US GERD is 2.5% of 
GDP, amounting to $330,045.5 million in 2006, far outstripping the raw expenditure 
levels quoted below.  
 
Research & Development Expenditure, Gross  
 
Source: CSO & ECB. 
 
 
Germany France UK Ireland
2,428,200 1,894,646 2,044,133 189,751
€ on R&D 61,433 39,409 35,977 2,922
2.53 2.08 1.76 1.54
2007, 
Millions, 
Current €
% of GDP 
on R&D, 
Ireland GNI
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Even for supporters of the incremental model, like Dr. Dan Breznitz of MIT, 
innovation policy is still considered far too FDI-orientated to be successful. It seems 
like the sole purpose of the HEA has been to produce a labour force that is attractive 
to foreign investment without developing a base for innovation-based homegrown 
industries.  Breznitz squarely places the blame on the fact that the Irish government's 
financial support policies for innovation have single-handedly created one of the 
smallest and least developed venture capital markets in the developed world. This 
stark reality has been combined with a banking sector whose lending practices have 
almost exclusively considered projects that are directly related to the property sector, 
thus stifling any prospects of diversification or the development of a homegrown 
innovation sector.  
 
To return to the question at hand, the jury is still out on the policies of the HEA with 
respect to redirecting higher education in Ireland towards innovation. Mr. Paul 
Tansey in his February 29th, 2008 article in the Irish Times entitled “Innovate or 
Stagnate” outlined a cogent critique of government policy on education, with which 
we largely concur.  If there is to be an implementation of efficiency metrics there 
needs to be a series mid-term analyses of the objectives of the HEA, the Department 
of Education and the Department of Enterprise on the future of Third Level 
education in Ireland, since the current recurrent grant allocation model is directly 
designed to facilitate the application of policy objectives via financial incentives. 
The application of efficiency metrics will only add a brokerage mechanism to this 
model that will hardwire top-level priorities from the larger system of governmental 
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education policy preferences, further “nudging” academic freedom and creating a 
Matthew Effect for those institutions that comply with the sycophancy that defines 
the “strong bureaucrat” method of education that George Santayana condemned 
Harvard University of suffering from in the first half of the twentieth century. I 
therefore advise caution in the application of efficiency metrics to resource 
allocation until a reappraisal of educational policy objectives has taken place. Once a 
measure becomes a target it ceases to be a measure. Instead it creates incentives and, 
thereby, more often than not, rent seeking and a tool for vested interests.  
 
Higher education itself has changed remarkably over the past century. Harvard 
President Charles Eliot redesigned the delivery of courses that went from a 
curriculum with 80% required courses in 1890 to one with 70% elective courses by 
1901, eventually settling at an average of 40% required courses.  From 1945-2000 
there has been an eight times increase in bachelor degrees being issued, averaging 
1.2m per annum.  
At the same time, this increase in graduate production has not been matched by a 
commensurate increase in academic publications. According to the US Department 
of Education, fewer than half of the staff of all of the US universities publish as 
much as 1 article per annum (this must be qualified slightly, since a single high 
quality article or groundbreaking text can be much more valuable than half a dozen 
parochial and mediocre articles in low quality journals).11 Fully 70% consider 
themselves teachers and not researchers, which is, of course, not necessarily a bad 
                                                 
11This is why in many systems research quality is measured through impact factors and citation 
scores. 
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thing. This is in keeping with the distribution of universities in the US, where 45% 
of the college population are based at two-year institutions, commonly referred to as 
“community colleges”. The primary purpose of these institutions is to teach and they 
generally only award associate's degrees (2 year undergraduate degrees) and have 
bachelor degrees as their terminal qualification. The importance of teaching to many 
of the smaller colleges in the US has also created a great deal of concern about the 
future of higher education in America, outlined in a book by the former president of 
Harvard University, Derek Bok, entitled Our Underachieving Colleges (2006). He 
finds that US universities are ignoring some important aspects of education delivery, 
namely, pedagogy, college majors (i.e. ignoring majors which have limited prima 
facia marketability or ability to draw external funding) and the neglect of moral and 
civic development. These problems within the American academy are most clearly 
seen in the teaching of English composition. This subject is supported by a supply of 
teaching provided mostly by low paid and time poor adjunct professors.  Academic 
career prospects and a general disdain for the job of teaching remedial English 
composition has resulted in the low-cost, low-fuss solution being sought by most 
faculties.  Though this may appear to be immaterial to the “knowledge economy”, 
according to the Wall Street Journal poll “Work Week” (12/29/98 p. A1) 
communication skills were the most important skills to firms and the skills that most 
college graduates would be lacking. An example of the lack of interest in this aspect 
of academic development of undergraduates can be seen by the singular lack of 
research conducted in the role of universities in critical thinking development. The 
sole monograph, to our knowledge, on the topic dates from 1990 (Critical Thinking: 
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A Statement of the Expert Consensus for the Purposes of Educational Assessment 
and Instruction (1990)). Universities, despite the fact that undergraduate education 
defines a large part of their role, are not terribly interested in the delivery of this 
education. How did this happen? 
 
The focus on research as a principle concern for universities finds its origin in early 
nineteen century Prussia.12 The idea of a system of higher education as outlined in 
France and Germany following the Napoleonic era was based on the concept of 
professor as state functionary. The crucial difference between the French and the 
German (Humbolt) models was that the French desired to train their students and 
prepare them for state teaching responsibilities and the Germans designed a system 
where individuals could acquire the “tools” to pursue knowledge and make 
discoveries. The UK universities and Trinity College Dublin were unique 
universities within the European context, having retained a clerical focus and a 
residential system with substantial financial resources in the form of land grants and 
endowments. They retained an older view of humanism (i.e. Early Modern) and saw 
the creation of degrees as the principle objective of their operations.  
 
The intellectual importance of the German theologian Schleiermacher was key to the 
design of the German university. The role of Wissenschaft (the systematic 
acquisition, pursuit and discovery of knowledge) and how it was to be taught was 
                                                 
12
 Much of the information for this part on the origins of the research university is drawn 
from Rüegg, Walter, Ed. A History of the University in Europe Volume III: Universities in 
the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (1800-1945). CUP, 2004. 
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key to these early reforms and how these institutions (and those of the rest of 
Northern Continental Europe) were designed from the outset.  
 
The power of the Schleiermacher model of the university was carried on through the 
link of philosophical speculation on scientific ideas into empirical science.  The 
science of language was the start of this process.  “This new scientific spirit, whose 
'enthusiasm and joy' (Begeisterung und Seligkeit) according to Niebuhr, enlivened 
the first years of the University of Berlin; this nuclear method pushed research to the 
innermost core of all things and opened the way to the surge of the modern 
university.”13  
 
Before World War I the German speaking universities were so deeply convinced of 
the unity of philosophy with mathematics and natural philosophy. The creation of 
separate departments in these subjects took place quite late, as they were only 
created in Tubingen (1869), Strasburg (1872) and Heidelberg (1890) and Frankfurt-
am-Main (1914) and later in the British Isles. The conviction of the institutions was 
that philosophy would provide the necessary core, the unity of the humanities with 
the natural sciences and the social sciences. This conviction was so strong that 
Vienna and Graz did not create separate departments until 1975. 
 
“...Werner von Siemens (1816-92), who had stated that mankind had entered the age 
of science in which the natural sciences were orientated towards practical use, thus 
                                                 
13
 Ibid at 15 
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making good Francis Bacon's (1561-1626) postulate that nature can be dominated 
through science.”14 This linked the new German university with the older pre-
modern universitates concept but now fostered the modern scientias concept.  
 
“Wiehem von Humbolt took this as the basis of his idea of a university: 'The 
university's domain is what man can only find through and within himself – insight 
into science. Freedom is necessary and solitude helpful to this self-act in its own 
understanding, and the entire outer organization of the university flows from these 
two points. Attending lectures is only secondary; what is essential is that for a series 
of years one lives in close connection with like-minded people of the same age, who 
are aware that in this same place there are many thoroughly learned people, 
dedicated solely to the elevation and diffusion of science.' 
 As a university professor, Schleiermacher gave new meaning to the 
delivery of and attendance of lectures, in order to apply the liberal idea of the 
student's own responsibility for his studies more concretely than did the private man 
of learning and statesman... Humbolt: 'The teacher must produce everything he says 
before his listeners: he must not narrate what he knows, but rather reproduce his 
own way to knowledge, the action itself. The listeners should not only collect 
knowledge. They should directly observe the activity of intelligence producing 
knowledge and, by observing it, learn how to do it themselves.'”15 
 
Universities in this new Humboltian arrangement were very much “creatures” of the 
State as opposed to the Catholic or Protestant Churches as they had been in the past. 
The original intention of having universities outside of the main city in a principality 
was to enable the authorities to keep track of the student population and movements 
within it from a distance and the small locations provided ease for this observation. 
There were various responses to political unrest.  One was to suppress students, as 
was the case in Germany but in France, the curriculum was so tightly put together 
that the students were actually supportive of the regime and the discipline of the 
university system.  
                                                 
14
 Ibid at 19 
15
 Ibid at 21 
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The reforms of Napoleon I were generally considered to bring about an academic 
desert, where no real research or innovation took place. The sole places allowed 
these indulgences were the Sorbonne, Collège de France and the Institut de France. 
The State awarded the degrees, determined the curriculum and offered only 
specialist routes to state service of one kind or another.  
“In Germany the pressures of modern technology resulted in changes in the 
university system, whereby it became much more hierarchical. Student numbers, 
which had remained roughly constant between 1830 and 1865, had quintupled by 
1914 to a total of 61,000. 
 
This growth benefited the small universities and the arts faculties in particular. For 
the first time for centuries there were more students in the arts faculties than in law, 
and registrations in the theology faculties had dropped by a half over the period 
1830 to 1914. These developments mirrored the change in orientation of university 
study towards modern careers. In addition to the established universities, technical 
universities had developed from the former state or private specialist colleges: 
Aachen in 1879-80 (founded in 1865 as a polytechnic), Berlin in 1879 (1799, a 
royal building academy), Brunswick in 1877 (1745, Collegium Carolinum), Danzig 
in 1904, Darmstadt in 1868 (1812, a school for building), Dresden in 1890 (1742, 
an engineering academy), Hanover in 1879 (1831, a higher school of commerce), 
Karlsruhe in 1865 (1800, Weinbrenner's school for building), Munich in 1868 
(1827, a poly technical central school), Stuttgart in 1876 (1829, a united art, 
science and commerce school). 
 
The new students, who were less likely to come from the educated middle classes 
than before, took a pragmatic view. Studying in order eventually to earn their living 
(Brotstudenten), they had little sympathy for Humboldt's educational ideals and 
sought instead a training for a particular career. This often led to misunderstandings 
with the professors, who were becoming ever more specialized in their particular 
fields and more remote from existing society, some of them taking refuge in a 
profound yearning for a lost Germany. The growth in student numbers and the 
multiplicity of possible fields of study awakened conservative fears of 'an academic 
proletariat'. Indeed, there was a lack in the German university system of a 
regulatory mechanism like the French concours. … 
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The crisis also affected those who sustained this ideal, the professors, as can be seen 
in the structural, social and ideological changes in the teaching body. The first 
change led to a rapid growth in non-professorial staff, who in certain disciplines, 
such as the sciences and medicine, formed the majority without having any say in 
the decisions of their faculty. The disparity between the numbers of professors and 
those of readers or private tutors slowed down and made career advancement more 
difficult. All of this encouraged a dissatisfaction, which found expression before 
1914 in a movement founded by the non-professorial staff. The rapid growth of non-
professorial staff can only be explained in part by the financial policies of the state, 
which benefited from teachers with lower salaries or indeed with none at all. It was 
also a consequence of the greater social status of the professorship, which attracted 
ever more candidates. A further factor was the growing specialization of 
scholarship, which usually meant that the emergent fields of study were delegated to 
non-professorial colleagues, at least initially. This had a positive effect on their 
innovatory powers, but at the same time it produced frustration, for it was not 
possible to promote all of them. The difference in status was reflected in the levels 
of income. Candidates for a professorship either had to have their own income until 
they were appointed, or had to make do with a second class position. Shortly after 
the First World War, Max Weber (1864-1920) declared that: 'In essence a career in 
academic life in Germany is based on a plutocracy'.   
 
In addition, the autonomy of the universities was increasingly circumscribed by the 
interventions of the state in appointments to professorships  - as indeed was the case 
in the whole of Europe - and by an increasing dependency on the state for the 
financing of research institutes in the sciences, of medicine, of research expeditions, 
and for the funding of expanding library expansion in the arts. In Berlin the salaries 
of the main professorships formed the major part of the university budget in 1860. 
From 1870 onwards it was the seminars and institutes, and their costs were growing 
faster than those of the personnel, so that in 1910 half of the university budget was 
taken up by the running costs of the institutes and seminars, to which must also be 
added the costs of buildings and equipment. … On the one hand the removal of 
'large-scale research' (Grossforschung), as demanded by Theodor Mommsen (1817-
1903) in 1890, was supposed to prevent the university from turning into 'a huge 
factory' (Grossbetrieb), … and the link between research and teaching was in fact 
maintained in the universities. On the other hand, however, the German university 
and academic system as a whole, if one ignored the concours-system and the elite 
universities in the form of the grandes ecoles, was getting perilously close to the 
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Napoleonic model which in its origins it had rejected totally.”16  
 
 
 
The German academic situation at the turn of the century reflects the current 
circumstances in the US and Ireland. Rapid expansions, technological changes and a 
caste system within academic employment placed the German system in a position 
of sclerotic conservatism and undermined their machinery civic development while 
at the same time using the aims of invention and quality assurance as protections 
from scrutiny. The research-driven university model, a model that was embraced and 
modified in the US during the twentieth century has made considerable progress in 
advancing science and leading to industrial innovation but the current system is not 
without academic or economic costs. Universities, though they appear to be just 
another element of service provision within the economy, are highly complex 
institutions that do not follow standard models of supply and demand. Educational 
institutions, like medical institutions, determine their own supply and demand on the 
basis of different legal and associative structures and not by market activities alone. 
In the area of pricing, the pure information mechanism of the market, education and 
medicine typically do not operate clear pricing structures and rely heavily on 
different forms of subsidy to perform their various activities. If one takes the 
example of one course, economics, the university determines that supply by the 
number of places. The academics determine the course on the basis of academic 
research. The academics themselves are determined by a non-market mechanism 
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 Ibid at 57-61 
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that sees academic distinction and prestige as its key principles. The students enter 
on the basis of a centralized procedure of examination and are charged fixed prices 
that bear no resemblance to their educational costs. Students cannot, for the final 
five seats in a course, bid-up their fees to gain entry. Students and academics make 
choices on which university to attend or be employed by on the basis of non-market 
determinants, such as overall prestige or the presence of certain eminent persons on 
the faculty. Though Harvard, Columbia and Yale make much of their respective 
endowment managers and their respective war chests, academics and students flock 
to Harvard for its prestige and its pre-eminence in scholarship, not its fourth quarter 
earnings. The desire to compete in this market for prestige is expensive and as a 
general principle it can be considered that all institutions of learning and medicine 
suffer from a simple resource allocation model. They will desire to obtain all the 
revenue they can possibly gain and then find ways to spend all the revenue they 
have gained. Put quite simply, the nature of these organisations is to be insatiable.  A 
realisation of that principle is part of the reason why methods of academic 
governance have become so complex. Academic governance has devolved into a 
situation of “Balkanisation” which comes with material effects on the social capital 
of individuals within universities.  It has also brought about different models of 
resource allocation.  
 
“The fundamental problem for research universities which have such a rich reservoir 
of information of value to integrated regional development can be summed up 
simply. The organisational forms and institutional support and reward systems which 
have served the expansion of knowledge so well have resulted in (a) fragmented 
academic disciplines, each with (b) distinct vocabularies and methodologies for 
developing and communicating about knowledge which are (c) neither easily 
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accessed nor understood by the other smart and dedicated contributors to the 
knowledge-driven economic development process.  
 This lack of fit and difficulty in communicating and collaborating across 
knowledge boundaries which separate spheres of expertise and authority is what 
needs to be addressed by universities if they are to be truly valuable contributors to 
regional economic development.”17  
 
To understand some of the deeper problems within the academy's personnel policies, 
look at this quote from a recent study on academic governance: 
“The university is a cruel institution. It takes the best and the brightest, promises 
them the world, and then it throws most of them to the dogs. The vast majority of 
scholars start out as fresh-eyed and bushy-tailed newly minted assistant professors; 
their careers peak as they become tenured associate professors; from then on their 
human capital declines steadily for reasons that are mostly not under their control. 
As a result, there is a lot of bitterness and resentment floating around in the heads of 
the tenured faculty. If the resulting morale problem is not properly addressed, it will 
clog the collective decision-making processes of the university. A well-designed 
university picks up its burned-out faculty and moves them into other activities they 
can take pride in, such as teaching or administration.  
 (Empathy with burned-out tenured faculty might come across as 
misplaced, given that the tenured faculty contribute to the overproduction of Ph.D.s, 
as a result of which many of the best and brightest never reach the level of assistant 
professor in the first place, which creates a lot of unhappiness. A mind is a terrible 
thing to waste, and this mass wastage of minds is a disgrace to the university. 
Politically speaking, however, frustrated tenured faculty are more important than are 
the rejects of the academy: the latter don't vote.)”18 
 
 
The market for Ph.D.s was suffering from a glut of graduates as early as 1994, from 
when this quote on the state of the market for doctoral-level educated labour was 
written: 
“The training-job transitions of new Ph.D. recipients is becoming increasingly 
difficult and uncertain everywhere, because there is a structural shortage of the 
academic jobs for which they are primarily being trained. As the use of postdoctoral 
research positions is increasing and being extended, precariousness among young 
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 Mitra, Jay & Piero Formica, Eds. Innovation and Economic Development: University-
Enterprise Partnerships in Action. Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1997. pp 58. 
18
 Ehrenberg, Ronald. Ed. Governing Academia. London: Cornell UP, 2004, 85. Quoting a 
UCLA Political Science professor.  
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researchers is increasing well beyond any 'reasonable' limit. A certain degree of 
precariousness at the beginning of academic careers – associated with the well-
known phenomenon of the labour queue – seems to be inherent in the nature of 
scientific and academic research, in that time is needed for the selection process in a 
situation of uncertain quality. As we have seen, this precariousness was traditionally 
managed through the relationships between actors and organisations in the networks 
that operate in the intermediate space. Nevertheless, the rapid development of the 
systematic use of post-doc positions, which are regarded in part as a source of cheap 
labour, is tending to unbalance or even disrupt the intermediate labour market. The 
public authorities have an important role to play in bringing this market segment 
back under control through the use of various regulatory or incentive mechanisms. 
Without intervention, which should certainly be adapted to each country's 
circumstances, the pool of young researchers may well dry up, either through 
depletion or because young people are discouraged from entering academia. In the 
long term, this would undermine the very basis of knowledge production upon 
which the new 'knowledge economy' rests.”19 
 
 
The university governance structures can be seen as the outcome of external and 
internal forces to ensure that the university supplied what these interest groups 
desire. Organizational structures with departmental-specific and college-specific 
jurisdictions can produce Pareto-inferior choices for the top-level administrator. 
 
“The hierarchical structure of organizations can largely be interpreted as a device for 
the resolution of conflicts, with each grade of the hierarchy specializing in resolving 
the conflicts of the grade beneath it. The very structure of an organization can be 
regarded as a “constitution,” a constitution being defined as a previously agreed 
method of resolving conflicts which have not yet arisen. We can go further and argue 
that virtually all organizational decisions are the end product of a process of conflict 
resolution between the points of view of various section and departments.”20  
 
The development of a successful model of university financial management has also 
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 Caroline Lanciano-Morandat & Hiroatsu Nohara. “The Labour Market for Ph.D.s. (chap. 
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been elusive: 
 
“... the reason for inefficiencies in the RCM [Revenue Centre Management, the basis 
for the HEA Recurrent Grant Allocation Model, HEFCE Model in the UK and the 
original Trinity College Academic Resource Allocation Model] model is the 
imperfect competition associated with a small number of units competing for many 
types of students. In particular, quality level are set below the levels that perfectly 
competitive units would choose. Similarly, imperfectly competitive private firms 
that sell a good at a single unit price usually supply an inefficiently low amount of 
this good, in an attempt to drive up the price. It is well known, however, that this 
inefficiency could be eliminated if these firms were able to perfectly price 
discriminate, selling each unit of the good at a different price, namely, the maximum 
price that consumers are willing to pay for each unit. In this case, supply would be 
expanded to the point where the price of the next unit equalled the cost of the next 
unit, which is the necessary efficiency condition.  
 Under centralized budgeting, something akin to perfect price 
discrimination is also occurring. At the margin, each unit is offering to “sell” another 
increment of educational services to the center in return for additional funds equal to 
the true cost of these services. In other words, the provision of additional services is 
generating no additional profits for the unit. ... The units are able to generate positive 
profits, however, by collecting fixed payments from the center [central budget 
holder/common communal funds].”21 
 
 
In the situation where social welfare (in the wider sense of overall well-being) is the 
concern of the centre the end result is that the true social costs of the last unit of 
educational service is paid by the centre. The price of education at the margin is only 
being efficiently priced in the centralised model not by RCM. RCM only provides 
financial compensation for the student in one course regardless of the content or 
quality of that course. This creates long-term viability issues as matters of 
educational quality, which is key to the university's ability to participate in the 
market for prestige, are not paid for by the individual RCM units but by an ever 
dwindling pool of resources from the centre. The final result is that RCM forces 
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decisions to be made with respect to educational delivery and quality that has an 
impact on the general health of the institution's finances. These results are robust 
with a variable population of students. RCM does not deliver a superior result to 
centralised budgeting.  
 
The issue of space rental from the centre is a factor that would potentially entrench 
the system if university policy is aimed at using improved/enlarged spaces as a 
method of attracting students. RCM has focused on least-cost methods, entrenching 
many of the less favorable outcomes outlined above on the problems of 
undergraduate education. The only solution found with these models was to abandon 
them over the medium term or to rely upon a large endowment to engage in 
consumption smoothing. American state university systems commonly use this 
structure but engage in active trade-offs. The University of California system being 
the most successful example using Clarke Kerr's “Master Plan” of the 1950s which 
combined resource allocation models with an apex structure of universities. As a 
result the UC system has some of the poorest community colleges in the US but also 
academic leaders, such as UCLA and UC Berkeley. This skewing of resources has 
been eschewed by most state universities but these systems also do not have leading 
colleges. This is not to say that they do not provide an adequate or in some cases 
superior undergraduate education but they typically do not enter into the Doctoral 
Granting or Research University categories of the Carnegie Classification system for 
universities (the top two rungs). Policymakers, in state-funded higher education 
systems, must make distinctions between what they desire – efficiency or equity. 
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Due to their financial structures, Irish universities, like virtually all their European 
counterparts, must compare themselves to American state universities, not the 
princely-funded giants like Harvard, Yale, and Princeton.  
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The innovation institutional model.  
 
The US shows a decline in Business Expenditure on Research and Development 
over the 1990s while the EU begins to expand at that stage bar the French. The US 
being a benchmark would state that the EU should reduce involvement in this area. 
During the 1990s the US and Ireland showed strong investment figures, with the rest 
of the EU declining. Much of this can be explained by the greenfield nature of 
Ireland as well as the US innovation model moving out of publicly funded research 
and development. In addition, the Irish case was distorted by the influence of heavy 
Foreign Direct Investment in computer technology, skewing GDP growth figures 
while at the same time showing a decrease in R&D. 
 
“If we take Ireland out of the equation it would imply a negative relationship 
between the public-private research factor and growth. This does not necessarily 
mean that there is anything wrong with public-private linkages, but perhaps too 
much is being expected of them in the European context.”22  
 
 
Excessive expectations are part of the structure of European innovation policy 
development. The Lisbon 2010 Strategy relies upon using various benchmarking 
exercises. Those benchmarks are US-based and have not been altered to take 
account of the fact that the US system has different institutional and legal structures. 
These include very important instances of path dependency. Research on innovation 
structures illustrate that path dependency can be both a strong source of assistance or 
hindrance to policy effectiveness. The general openness of civil society to 
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 Lorenz, Edward & Bengt-Åke Lundvall. How Europe's Economies Learn: 
Coordinating Competing Models. OUP, 2006, 41-2. 
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innovation and the general level of education in society are also factors strongly 
correlated to countries and regions where state-driven innovation policies have been 
a success. This is seen in the discussion of knowledge spillovers. Knowledge 
spillovers continues to be a major discussion topic in the innovation strategy sector – 
the problem with this stream of literature is that much of the current trade research 
does not place that much weight on the idea of spillovers, only the macromodels are 
willing to engage in such speculation.  
 
It is important to note that correlation is not the same as causation and that many 
policies attempt to recreate environments artificially that existed in other successful 
locations organically in order to exploit a misunderstanding between correlation and 
causation. This policy failure is further amplified when it is accompanied by high 
expectations, based upon a flawed notion of prediction where innovation is 
considered to be incremental and easily effected. This may be true, to a certain 
extent, of process innovation (e.g. building a better toaster) but not of fundamental 
innovation  (inventing a new mathematical algorithm for computer processing). 
Fundamental innovations, such as Google, are by their nature uncertain and cannot 
easily be planned, timed or replicated.  
 
As mentioned above national systems of innovation (NSI) is an area of economics 
that apparently goes back to Fredrich List (1841) Das Nationale System der 
Politischen Ökonomie. Modern researchers, drawing from List's original work, use a 
typology of knowledge for their analysis:  
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 Individual Collective 
Explicit Embrained Knowledge Encoded Knowledge 
Tacit Embodied Knowledge Embedded Knowledge 
 
Source: Lorenz, Edward & Bengt-Åke Lundvall. How Europe's Economies Learn: 
Coordinating Competing Models. OUP, 2006, 117. 
 
Mode 1 and Mode 2 of knowledge production 
Mode1                Mode2 
Produced in strict academic environment         Produced in relation to its application 
Disciplinary                             Transdisciplinary 
Homogeneous                Heterogeneous 
Hierarchical organistion              Non-Hierarchical organisation 
Not Socially Accountable              More socially accountable 
Produced by academics or technicians             Produced by a wide set of actors 
 
Much of these models of knowledge processing and creation are related to firm 
structure, most notable bureaucracy models of firm organisation. The importance of 
these hierarchical structures within the university was outlined above but it also 
applies to private sector firms and society at large. Again the importance of wider 
society to accept innovations and work freely between the different dimensions of 
the knowledge typology matrix is key to greater knowledge creation and turning 
human know-how into viable income flows. The necessity of this “knowledge 
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society” to innovation indicts overly narrow education systems, both in scope and in 
participation. The narrow education system is the one that is embodied by the 
US/UK model where there are narrow professional education streams and a strong 
focus on academic credentials and little regard for expertise that is acquired from 
practical problem solving learning, i.e. vocational training.  This results in a highly 
educated elite and a larger poorly educated general population. A broad education 
system is one that is competence-based and has important roles for both the vocation 
and academic education streams, such as in the Netherlands, Germany and Japan. 
Essentially, the narrow model of learning will only result in limited innovation since 
it is so heavily focused on the creation of a bureaucracy model of economic growth 
with little regard for society. In  the end this model gives rise to the dreaded rentier 
model of economic activity. A quick analysis of the current economic practices in 
Ireland and the lobby system in the United States provides affirmation of much of 
what this hypothesis of innovation pass-through posits.  
 
The one interesting aspect of much of this work on innovation is the fact that it does 
consistently suffer from an over-determined, typically linear but sometimes cyclical, 
system of analysis. Writers such as Walt Rostow23 and Nikolai Kondratiev are partly 
                                                 
23
 Rostow's five stages: 
•  The Traditional Society (pre-Newtonian) 
•  Preconditions for Take-Off (driven by invasion/exogenous) 
•  Take-Off (Endogenous/Blocks to progress removed/Technologically 
driven) 
•  Drive to Maturity (Sustained economic growth with technology 
spreading across all sectors of the economy/import substitution/new import 
requirements/expansion of exports) 
•  Age of High Mass-Consumption (An economy focused on the creation 
of durable goods/factory employment/social welfare created) 
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to blame for these concepts of innovation and economic development.  The focus of 
their ideas is, in essence, the notion of progress. Progress in the sense of the 
consistent march that gave rise to Herbert Spencer and Robert Malthus both using 
the terms “evolve” and “evolution” in their work. The idea that this system of 
continuous “change” or “innovation” will be at the outset (1) positive and (2) 
employment producing is part of an analysis that looks at the particular and attempts 
to project (in the form of theoretical statement) to the general. This projection of a 
description of the particular to the general is done without making any 
considerations for sample size or for the over-arching pitfalls that are at the core of  
Bacon's warnings about the idols that science must avoid and combat.  The nature of 
investigation and the nature of development are being intertwined in this discussion 
of innovation policy, with one crucially buttressing the other.24  
 
Part of the attraction of this early theory of innovation and growth grows out of 
underlying issues with the accounting for technology in economic growth. Joan 
Robinson wrote an account of the various failed attempts to understand the links 
between technology and growth in  “Misunderstandings in the Theory of 
Production” Greek Economic Review Volume 1 (1979).  The mid-twentieth century 
assessment of the US Institutionalist School  addressed the initial response of the US 
                                                                                                       
•  Beyond Consumption (Pursuit of satisfaction in areas beyond the control 
of material goods and the marginal utility of consumption/reflected in a baby-boom) 
24
 For those that do no know the Baconian idols they are from Sir Francis Bacon in his New 
Atlantis: 
 
 Idols of the Tribe (peculiarities to the race) idola tribus 
 Idols of the Den (peculiarities to the individual)  idola specus 
 Idols of the Marketplace (abuse of language)  idola fori 
 Idols of the Theater (abuse of authority) idola theatri 
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academy to the problem of growth and technology. The general scorn for high 
theory held by the Institutionalism resulted in an analytical framework where 
detailed descriptions of economic facts became the exposition of economic theory. 
That description became theory was most notably a problem in Veblen's work. This 
is important to remember since Veblen is one of the intellectual progenitors of 
human capital theory.  
 
“A latter-day saint of the institutionalist school, C.E. Ayres, provided one of the most 
intriguing accounts of the historical interaction of technology and institutions; but, 
like Veblen's, his 'theory' is really description, and flawed description at that.  
According to Ayres, technology is a dynamic, 'progressive' force – impersonal, 
automatic, self-propelled – whereas institutions are uniformly resistant to change. In 
Ayres' view, economic development – indeed, history itself – was the outcome of the 
permanent tension or struggle between progressive technology and conservative (or 
reactionary) institutions. However fascinating for undergraduate readers, Ayres's 
'theory' shared the faults of his predecessors' in the institutionalist and historical 
schools as well as their neglect of and contempt for market processes.”25 
 
 
In the Irish case the theory of rapid-innovation based industry (RIB) was applied. 
This was largely due to the idea of useful economic backwardness. This is a concept 
that sees economic development as easied in less advanced countries since industry 
and technology are afforded greenfield status  since there are no pre-existing 
obsolete capital goods that need to be ushered aside to bring about “progress”.  This 
theory of development was associated with Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) and the 
policy focus was that the more backward the country the more state intervention 
required to cause growth. 
                                                 
25
 Cameron, R. “Technology, Institutions and Long-Term Change” Economics in the Long 
View: Essays in Honour of W.W. Rostow.  Charles Kindleberger & Guido di Tella,  Eds. In 
3 Vols. London: Macmillan, 1982. Vol 1. pp27-43.: pp30. 
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Daniel Breznitz provides the clearest analysis of the impact of a state-driven 
approach to innovation and economic growth: 
 
“There are two main strands of systems-of-innovation theories. The American strand 
focuses more on the influences emanating from the different ways in which R&D is 
organized and finance (Nelson 1993).  The European school, originated at Ålborg, 
has been more focused on explanations based on users (or user sectors) to producers, 
and has a stronger emphasis on the role of the quality of demand on the development 
of capabilities; that is, greater attention is given to the correlation between the 
sophistication level of customer and users and the overall innovation capability of 
their suppliers. (Lundvall 1992, Lundvall et al. 2002). 
 
Systems-of-innovation theories implicitly argue that three main variables explain the 
amount and intensity of industrial R&D of each system, all intimately connected to 
the fact that industrial R&D is a semipublic good. The first variable is the location of 
industrial R&D activities within the industrial system. The levels of industrial R&D 
sophistication and capabilities differ according to whether most of the industrial 
R&D is conducted by the firms themselves or by public and semipublic 
organizations like research institutions and universities. Systems-of-innovation 
theories contend that there are major differences between systems depending on the 
location (public or private) and the identity of the agents that typically conduct most 
of the R&D. While most writers do not deal with these issues in detail, the logical 
conclusion of their argument is that the more R&D that is conducted by private 
firms, the more private industry develops sophisticated R&D capabilities.  
 
The second variable is financing. Different financing modes affect not only the 
location of R&D activities but also the focus (time horizons and product versus 
process innovation) and amount of industrial R&D.  
... 
The third explanatory variable highlighted by systems-of-innovation theories is the 
industrial-opportunity structure: the composition of the local industry, including the 
links among producers, between producers and customers, and between the local 
industry and the global production networks, in particular, with the MNCs that 
control them.”26 
 
 
In his context he compares Ireland with Israel and Taiwan. All have slightly different 
approaches to innovation-driven economic growth. Taiwan is high focused on 
                                                 
26
 Breznitz, Dan. Innovation and the State: Political Choice and Strategies for Growth in 
Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland. London: Yale UP, 2007. pp. 26/7. 
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certain leading industries and is defined by heavy regulation. It has much in 
common with the neo-mercantilist economic policies of the ASEAN group. Israel is 
a more neutral approach in both regulation and industries. What Israel has excelled 
at was the development of a deep and broad venture capital system which has 
continually supported and advanced their innovation-growth policy. Ireland is 
between Taiwan and Israel. Ireland has not created a robust, deep or broad venture 
capital system due to crowding out effects of organisations such as Enterprise 
Ireland, that undermine established venture capital business models. The relative 
inexperience of universities has also been detrimental to the development of a more 
comprehensive innovation system. This is partly the result of internal political 
difficulties that marry a neo-liberal approach to government regulation and 
intervention with a strongly stateist approach to economic development, particularly 
innovation policy. In Ireland the state remains the single largest source of venture 
capital, a situation which is not replicated in other high-growth, innovation-let small 
open economies. Enterprise Ireland does not provide sufficient levels of early state 
investment (the Angle Investor stage to use the jargon) to encourage the sort of 
technology-driven start-ups that state policy desires.  This can be seen in some of the 
“success stories” of Irish economic history.  
 
Ireland's economic development as accepted policymakers, according to Breznitz, is 
the story of T.K. Whitaker and Economic Development where a strong change in 
state policy with state fostered industry gave rise to the eventual “Celtic Tiger” 
economy. The facts relating to Irish economic history are clearly not as simple. 
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Despite the importance of Whitaker's planning to Ireland's development there were 
additional factors.  
 
One of those additional factors was the influence of outside organisations of Irish 
economic and education policy. This was most clearly seen in the response of 
Minister for Education Donogh O'Malley to the OECD reports on education in 
Ireland Investment in Education  (1965) and Review of National Education Policies 
– Ireland (1969). The opening up of free secondary education was a watershed 
event.  
 
Ireland's policy to education has always been driven by economic imperatives. 
“Better education will support and stimulate continued economic expansion. Even 
the economic returns from investment in education and training are likely to be as 
high in the long run as those from investment in physical capital”27 Education was 
about jobs and economic development. It was the position taken in the 1960s and it 
has continued to the present day. Ireland wanted to expand universities rapidly but 
did not apply the two stream approach of the Northern Europeans. Ireland's focus 
was to intertwine technology and education. This was reaffirmed in the Culliton 
Report. Science, technology, research and development were the rallying cries of 
ministers and policymakers alike when it came to education. The unfortunate 
problem was that the education policy debate froze in the early 1970s and never 
progressed, with the same underlying principles and objectives being recycled 
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 White, Tony. Investing in People: Higher Education in Ireland from 1960 to 2000. Dublin: 
Institute of Public Administration, 2001. pp 27. 
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regardless of what party was in power or the condition of the public finances.  
 
 
What continues to be consistently underestimated by Irish policymakers is the 
importance of secondary education to the development of the economy in the past 
and in the future. Claudia Goldin and Lawerence Katz in The Race Between 
Education and Technology (2008) illustrate using US and European historical data 
how the systematic policy of primary education in the early nineteenth century and 
the expansion of free secondary education throughout the late nineteenth and the 
first half of the twentieth century placed the United States at an advantage 
industrially vis-à-vis Europe. Secondary education especially seemed to be the 
deciding factor. Even within the European context the comparative strength of the 
Prussian education system was considered partly responsible for the easy routing of 
the Austro-Hungarian army. 
 
“The OECD influence was also critical in the early 1960s in the establishment of the 
regional technical colleges, which have been recently upgraded to institutes of 
technologies (OECD 1965,1969). This was the first in a series of changes that 
overhauled the Irish higher education system, first in the 1960s and continuing in 
more vigorous fashion in the 1980s after the IDA included education policy in its 
overall view of the supply side of Irish industrial policy.”28 
 
 
State intervention in education in the 1960s was not always welcome or successful. 
The failure of the merger between Trinity College and UCD had a long lasting 
impact. The origins of the computer software industry in Ireland can be found in an 
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attempt on the part of Trinity College to counter what was seen as a predatory attack 
on its engineering department in 1969. UCD responded by expanding its own 
computer science programme and produced the foundation for the successes in ICT 
of the recent years. This is a clear case of the universities responding against 
government policy and producing a growth inducing result.   
 
The creation of Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) was yet another attempt at 
government led economic growth. SFI's structures are based on the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) in the US.  William Harris, one of the first SFI directors, was in 
charge of one NSF division prior to his appointment.  
 
“By establishing these two programs [SFI and PRTLI] in 1998 the Irish state 
indicated its seriousness about transforming the academic research infrastructure. 
However, there are still many caveats as to the continuous state support for SFI and 
its medium- and long-term influence. Moreover, even when finally moving to 
upgrade the Irish research apparatus, the Irish state still employs FDI orientation – 
for example, in its insistence on the participation of foreign-based scientists. Hence 
questions remain as to whether the goal of the SFI is a genuine attempt to change the 
Irish economy capabilities toward rapid innovation-based industrialization or just 
the last stage in supply-side policies to create MNC-attracting human capital.  
 
Thus, although the development of the Irish education system is unprecedented in 
Irish history and has greatly helped to propel Ireland along the track of high-skills IT 
industrial development, it appears that the strategic view behind these developments 
treated education mainly as a way to produce high-skilled labor, not innovation and 
research. Only in the past five years have policies with a vision of making Irish 
higher education system more research orientated been implemented.”29 
 
 
State innovation policies are not without serious political implications: 
 
“...growing awareness that its main beneficiaries are company stockholders rather 
than local interests is currently encouraging much reconsideration. As flexible 
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production organization begins to supplant mass production as the leading edge of 
capitalist development, a clearer sense of the differences of radical local economic 
transformation seems to be in the air, and more realistic attempts to build 
incrementally on what already exists are now a major focus of attention. This 
situation is underscored by the widening internationalization of production and 
markets, and the imperative of maintaining the competitiveness not so much of 
lagging regions as of leading regions. In this, the needs of growing flexible 
production agglomerations have become paramount. Thus, innumerable trial efforts 
in institution-building and social regulation directed to heighten innovativeness and 
the search for superior product quality in such agglomerations are not on foot in 
many different countries, e.g., the United States .... and other parts of the World. An 
extensive but scattered corpus of theoretical speculation about the appropriate forms 
and functions of collective action in flexible-production agglomerations has also 
started to unfold. Some stock-taking seems to be in order.”30 
 
Ultimately, state-led policies are not the only solution. In many ways Ireland's 
political confusion combined with a desire to exploit its corporate rate of tax for FDI 
inflow purposes has resulted in a policy defined by a lack of commitment. The Irish 
State's policies have at once created incentives for rent-seeking by individuals, 
which undermines entrepreneurial activity and innovation but at the same time a 
slavish focus on MNC-driven taxation revenue (which was later added to by a 
property bubble) has turned the policymaking structure itself into ultimate rent-
seeker. The Irish government must also be aware of the potential pitfalls of an FDI-
driven policy of innovation. Issues related to the use of public funds for facilities 
and tax breaks and government (be it fully or partially) funded intellectual property 
need to be made clear to the various actors directly involved and to the electorate. 
The lack of success in innovation in Ireland is due to an endemic lack of focus and 
home-grown vision.  
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 Scott, Allen. Technopolis: High-Technology Industry and Regional Development in 
Southern California.  Oxford: University of California Press, 1993. pp 258. 
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This is not to say that European Union research policies will necessarily result in a 
well-balanced approach to research of education or in innovation. The focus on the 
need for “useful” research within the EU Framework Programmes has resulted in the 
near elimination of EU level support for basic fundamental research.  The 
implications of this policy for groundbreaking innovation is explored in Section 4 of 
this essay.  
 
The recent EU “Network of Excellence” system is an example of the problems of 
merging education policy so closely with innovation-led growth.  Universities are 
expected to pour significant amounts of their own internal funds into becoming a 
point within the European network. The incentives produced by this protracted and 
expensive networking process has been the growth in number and power of research 
bureaucrats (both at European and National level) whose main competence is 
precisely in networking, “steering”, writing lengthy reports and directing researchers 
do the same.  
 
At first the EU policy was a simple adaptation of the small business innovation 
research (SBIR) programme with the objectives being similar to that of the Bayh-
Dole Act. Essentially, restart the European (American) economy via the universities. 
This was not altogether unusual since science and technology have always been at 
the heart of the European politics since the 1950s with  Euratom.   
 
Science, technology and universities again attracted more political attention in the 
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early 1980s. The Delors Commission had a firmly integrationist agenda and was 
attempting to overcome the unemployment and slow growth of the post 1970s 
period. European universities begin the process of integration when Commissioner 
Peter Sutherland creates the Erasmus programme. Jacques Delors successfully 
grasped this momentum by putting  forward a whole package of initiatives, among 
them the large technology programme (the so-called Framework Programme (FP)). 
This had two effects. EU involvement in scientific technological matters and the 
pursuit of competitiveness were to be to the guiding forces on education. The Lisbon 
2010 objectives is the culmination of this process, which has become a major raison 
d'être of the European Union. 
 
Has the European policy of frameworks produced economic fruits? According to the 
data, information from science journals provides only 7.2% of the cited inputs into 
patented inventions.31 Despite EU incentives the development of human capital 
remains a national affair and firmly within the confines of the subsidiarity rule. The 
EU is actively encouraging university-firm linkages but these are largely determined 
along national lines and rely heavily on pre-existing social capital and legal 
structures to be successes or failures. This is what makes the Irish situation so 
important. Over the past fifty years Ireland has taken most of its education cues from 
external sources. In certain circumstances they have been a stunning success but in 
other they have encouraged rent-seeking and tribal hostilities.  
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Section 4 
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Where is the law in education? 
 
4.1 
Introduction  
 
In this section we review the regulation of higher education in Ireland.  The 
complicated series of controls (not all of which appear on the face of the statutory 
record) is apparent. Therefore, the link between economic issues and the 
development of HE takes place in an environment of particular complexity.  As 
noted in prior chapters, there are seven universities and 14 "institutes of technology” 
(ITs) in Ireland, as well as a number of other public institutions (such as teacher 
training colleges), private institutions, and a growing further education sector. They 
are governed by a patchwork of domestic legislation, administrative practices and 
international instruments.  
 
4.2 
Legislation and Powers  
 
In terms of the awarding of qualifications, universities and the Dublin Institute of 
Technology award their own degrees and are controlled by the Universities Act 1997 
and the Dublin Institute of Technology Act 1992 respectively. Other higher 
education institutes are either associated with a university or come under the 
auspices of the Higher Education Training and Awards Council (HETAC) 
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(established by the Qualifications Act 1999), who can then delegate award-making 
power to an individual institution. Around 150,000 students are in higher education 
in Ireland, with an age cohort participation of over 50% - a significant increase over 
the course of 20 years, though the persistence of underrepresentation, considered in 
the historical chapter that opens this paper, remains a significant and stubborn public 
policy challenge.  
 
The universities are creatures of charter or public legislation (from the Charter of 
Queen Elizabeth founding Trinity College “near Dublin” in 1592 to the Dublin City 
University Act and University of Limerick Act in the 1980s) but are governed in 
practice by a significant piece of general legislation, the Universities Act 1997 in 
terms of functions, powers, duties etc. For so long as a university is in receipt of 
public funds, it is bound by the Act; the funding is channelled through the Higher 
Education Authority (HEA) established by the Higher Education Authority Act 1971 
(the Act has been amended a number of times, typically to extend the Authority's 
powers and functions). The HEA has certain statutory powers in relation to 
university activities, primarily in relation to finance, although some general review 
powers – in the areas of equality and quality review, for example – are potentially 
wider in scope. However, the extent of the engagement by Government with still 
autonomous institutions (which, in the context of publicly funded institutions, are 
relatively autonomous by international standards) is limited both by express powers 
allocated to universities and by the removal of clauses objected to by universities 
during the difficult gestation of the Act over the course of a number of years. The 
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institutes of technology are governed by the Institutes of Technology Act 2006 
operating in conjunction with the Regional Technical Colleges Act 1992, and now 
also receive their funding through the HEA. Prior to 2006, the ITs were funded 
directly by the Department of Education and regulated by the prescriptive Regional 
Technical Colleges Act 1992 with significant involvement of local Vocational 
Education Committees.  
 
Funding and Policy  
 
HEIs in Ireland typically depend on State funding for the vast majority of income. 
This has traditionally been distributed under two headings, 'block grant' (allocated as 
a general grant without subheadings or targeting) and funding 'in lieu of fees' (tuition 
fees for Irish or EU students having been abolished in 1995). A new financial model 
(recurrent grant allocation model or RGAM) is currently being rolled out. This is 
carried out on a purely administrative basis, i.e. without any primary or secondary 
legislation, but is of particular interest to institutions and indeed the various interest 
groups as it can (in a classic exercise of power through budgetary control) influence 
the decisions and internal processes of institutions; it also contains a number of 
features that purport to contribute to the achievement of policy goals of interest to 
our project in terms of social and economic factors.  
 
The abolition of tuition fees, though an internationally notable aspect of Irish higher 
education policy, was implemented on an entirely non-statutory basis, and could be 
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changed by a Government without any changes to the law – indeed, section 41 of the 
Universities Act 1997 (which post-dates the abolition of undergraduate fees) 
explicitly maintains the power of the university (and not central government) to set 
fee levels. In practice, the fee for eligible undergraduates will be set by reference to 
the subvention that the institution will receive, although this again depends on 
voluntary cooperation between the institutions, their representatives (the IUA) and 
State authorities.  It is also worth noting that a number of influential reports have 
recommended the reintroduction of some form of fees (OECD 2004, National 
Competitiveness Council 2005, Royal Irish Academy 2005) – but the political 
climate is such that until recently , this was not a realistic prospect, and was not a 
serious proposal in the most recent election (2007).  The current Minister for 
Education, though, suggested in 2008 (in an extraparliamentary context and without 
formal Government support) that the matter is to be reviewed.  In any event, the fact 
that Government support is tied up in the grant ‘in lieu of fees’ (an 
administrative/budgetary concept) has caused significant problems for institutions 
who argue that overall financial support has dropped, and the debate on tuition fees 
during the summer of 2008 allowed this matter to be raised once more by 
institutions. 
  
Other sources of funding include targeted grants (e.g. for QA, e-learning, etc) and 
tuition fees for postgraduates (2nd/3rd cycle) and non-EU students. Little if any of 
this funding, in the case of targeted grants, is pursuant to a particular statute or 
statutory instrument; instead, it is typically funded through the Higher Education 
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Authority’s budget which is allocated to it in the annual Estimates and must be spent 
in a fashion that is not inconsistent with the Authority’s statutory mandate; however, 
this mandate is not constrained in a particularly onerous fashion. Ireland’s system of 
administrative governance is in transition, with a plethora of new arms-length 
agencies established in recent years (examples include the Commission for 
Communication Regulation, the Commission for Taxi Regulation, the proposed 
Dublin Transport Authority, and the controversial Health Services Executive). The 
factors that lead to this situation include a strengthening economy (until recently) 
and a reluctance (in the context of prevailing policy wisdom in the European Union) 
to engage in command and control economic planning.  In addition, an 
understandable distrust of political influence, exacerbated by the hyper-local context 
of Irish politics through the parliamentary/executive model, the operation of 
proportional representation through the single transferable vote in multi-seat 
constituencies, and the record of corruption and malpractice that has emerged in 
recent Tribunals, means that independence occupies a high priority in political 
discourse.  Finally, the relatively slow development of administrative law and 
‘agency law’ in Ireland in the 20th century means that some of the accountability 
and scrutiny measures familiar in other jurisdictions have not yet been enacted in 
this state. While there is some convergence between policy aims of central 
government and funding, such decisions are essentially acts of executive discretion 
and, subject to the normal restrictions of public law (judicial review of 
administrative action in limited situations) and of parliamentary oversight (at least in 
theory), there is a relatively wide freedom of action granted to the designers of such 
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funding schemes. Similarly, the fees set for students other than those included in the 
ambit of the ‘free fees’ scheme (in practice, the fees payable by many postgraduate 
students and all non-EU undergraduate students) do not see the involvement of the 
Department of Education nor the Higher Education Authority and thus reflect a 
flexible, uncomplicated method for institutions to increase and diversify their 
funding without regard to other authorities; whether this is appropriate or efficient in 
the context of national policy objectives is debatable. 
 
The OECD report of 2004 made a number of other significant recommendations 
(which do overlap with aspects of the Lisbon Agenda as discussed later in this)  that 
would require legislative change, such as the reduction in the size of university and 
IT governing authorities (regulated by the Universities Act, the private act applicable 
to TCD, and the legislation governing the Institutes of Technology), which  include 
student and staff representation, and many external members in most cases.  
 
These recommendations have not been implemented. However, the detailed HEA  
guidance on governance (set out in the Code of Governance), published in late 2007,  
is an alternative approach, not requiring further legislation but codifying statutory 
and other principles into a single, influential document.  
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4.3 
Quality Assurance and Accreditation  
 
It was also suggested (in the OECD report) that the system of quality review be 
rationalised. At present, the universities have statutory responsibility for ensuring 
that their QA procedures are reviewed externally, although this role is delegated to 
the Irish Universities Quality Board, an unusual legal structure co-funded  by the 
HEA and the universities (the latter acting through the Irish  Universities 
Association), incorporated as a private company and governed by a Board including 
representatives from each university (a minority of the total) and from a range of 
other constituencies.  Additionally the HEA may (Universities Act, section 49) 
review the QA procedures of a university (though, in the light of the Qualifications 
Act, these functions must now be performed after consultation with the NQAI); this 
is the legislative basis for the important review carried out (under contract) by the 
European Universities Association (EUA) in 2004 on behalf of the universities 
acting through the IUQB and the HEA. 
 
In the case of the institutes of technology and indeed private higher education 
institutions, receiving their accreditation or delegated authority from HETAC, it is 
HETAC that is responsible for agreeing quality assurance systems with the 
institution. In the case of the Dublin Institute of Technology, its  QA is reviewed by 
the National Qualifications Authority of Ireland. Finally, a  number of institutions 
(such as colleges of education that are autonomous but have  their degrees awarded 
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by a university) do not fit easily into any category.  
 
Overall,  though, the level of scrutiny is somewhat lower than that applied by the 
Quality Assurance Agency in the UK (in particular in the case of the universities)  It 
should also be noted that some professional associations (such as the Institute of  
Engineers in Ireland) as well as statutory professional bodies (such as An Bord  
Altranais (‘The Nursing Board’)) are involved in the regulation of higher education  
through the accreditation of programmes in institutions (including universities and  
institutes of technology); this process, not yet aligned with quality review nor with 
HETAC approval, is an interesting one as, at the level of the programmes that seek  
professional accreditation, the granting or withholding of such status is of paramount  
importance and thus the system of accreditation and review is influential.   In the 
context of the gatekeeper functions (and support of rent-seeking behaviour) of the 
professions in Ireland, this sliver of educational control is worthy of careful 
consideration. 
 
4.4 
Reform  
 
Virtually all considerations of curricular change can be dealt with under the  
Government’s desire to see “higher education reform”; the principles of such  
development and reform being defined by government as including lifelong 
learning,  economic development, the building of capacity for research, and 
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improvements in  teaching and learning quality.  
 
In the Budget announced in 2005 and in subsequent budgets, the Minister for 
Finance  announced that €300m (over 5 years) would be allocated to a Strategic 
Innovation  Fund, the creation of which had been announced by the Minister for 
Education  earlier that year. The seven purposes of the fund were defined as 
rewarding  internal restructuring/rationalisation, improving performance 
management, staff and  structural reform, teaching and learning reform (inc. 
modularisation and e- learning), quality improvement, and 'access, transfer and 
progression' between institutions and  levels. These purposes draw from the 
principles of reform as outlined above and  overlap with areas of particular interest 
from the existing legislation (for example,  access transfer and progression is a 
function of the NQAI; quality improvement, of  course, is part of the partially-
legislative quality assurance question more generally). There have now  been two 
rounds of strategic funding (SIF 1 and SIF 2).  
 
4.5 
Non-Governmental Organisations   
 
A key player in the contemporary higher education field is the Irish Universities  
Association (IUA), which acts as a lobby group, a mechanism for coordination, a  
partner in the quality review system, among other things. In parallel with the  
professionalisation of Universities UK (UUK) in the neighbouring jurisdiction, the  
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IUA has an increasingly significant secretariat / central function, and is, in its own  
right, of particular relevance to any survey of the formation of higher education 
policy. The IUA document of 2005 on ‘Fourth Level Ireland’ is generally recognised 
(even by those who disagree with the substance of the IUA’s proposals) as an 
especially influential intervention. On the other hand, it is not uncommon for 
individual heads of universities (acting alone or in concert with others) to pronounce 
on important issues of HE policy and the tension between the collective and 
individual approaches has yet to be resolved.   
 
There are a number of other collective organisations in the sector, such as Institutes 
of Technology Ireland (IOTI, undergoing some development at the moment) and the 
relatively informal Council of Heads of Irish Colleges of Higher Education 
(CHOICE) and Higher Education Colleges Association (HECA) (private HETAC-
accredited institutions). The Union of Students in Ireland (USI) is an association of 
local students’ unions (which, unlike the UK, are not dealt with by law; they are also 
not directly analogous to trade unions or service associations and differ in terms of  
autonomy and financing across the jurisdiction) which, in practice, acts as both 
lobby  group and nominator of ‘student representatives’ or ‘learner representatives’ 
to bodies such as the HEA, NQAI and HETAC. Higher education workers 
(academic and non-academic staff) are represented by a number of trade unions, 
including general unions such as SIPTU (the largest Irish trade union) and sector-
specific unions like the Irish Federation of University Teachers (IFUT).  Most of the 
organisations mentioned in this section participate in relevant European bodies; for 
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example, HETAC is a member of the European network of quality assurance 
agencies (ENQA) and USI is affiliated to the European Students’ Union (ESU).  
 
4.6 
Observations   
 
The involvement of public bodies and the achievement of  policy objectives in Irish 
higher education is therefore a complex picture story that lacks a single author. As 
we note below, the European  and international landscape of higher education has 
seen significant reforms; in  Ireland, though, these developments, including the soft 
power of the OECD, is  refracted through administrative action, collective self-
regulation or co-regulation,  budgetary decisions and influence of NGOs. The 
difficult debate of the 1990s on higher education legislation and the ongoing 
anxieties in relation to the status of the ‘binary system’ and the institutes of 
technology seeking university status thus do not represent the totality of higher 
education regulation; a study of the Universities Act, for example, would not explain 
in full how the HEA influences the development of universities.  
 
4.7 
The Bologna Process 
 
The Bologna Process is a relatively unconventional structure in legal terms.  While 
having a strong relationship with the Council of Europe and in particular the 
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European Cultural Convention that the Council is responsible for (states must 
accede to the Convention if they wish to ‘join’ the Process), its decision-making 
structures are not those of a familiar intergovernmental organisation, and the 
Council’s role is quite limited.  Ireland ‘joined’ the Process at the first summit of 
Ministers in Bologna in 1999. 
 
The Process includes regular Ministerial summits (the most recent being in London 
in 2007) which have each issued a Communiqué and a Secretariat (based in and 
typically using staff from the state due to hold the next summit) but the work 
between summits and – in practice – much of the drafting and planning for a 
communiqué and for future events takes place under the watchful eye of the Bologna 
Follow-Up Group (BFUG).  Each member state (that is to say, members of the 
Process) are full members of the BFUG (as is the European Commission), and a 
variety of ‘stakeholder’ organisations such as the European Universities Association, 
the European Students’ Union and Education International (trade union) are non-
voting members of the BFUG, although these organisations tend to play a very 
active role at meetings and in Bologna activities.  The BFUG establishes various 
Working Groups (with membership typically including a number of member states 
and organisations) and organises or recognises seminars and conferences.  From 
each working group or event, a report or set of recommendations may emerge.  
Many of these will be referred to in a future communiqué and indeed the details are 
invariably contained in such documents; an example is the evolving European 
Quality Assurance Register in Higher Education (EQAR) launched in March 2008 
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that has emerged from a number of Bologna follow-up processes. 
 
Signatory states are required to participate in various reporting activities, and play a 
role in the planning of future activities and action lines (although participation varies 
and not every state is represented at every meeting).  Civil servants in the relevant 
national ministry attend BFUG meetings, and parallel structures are expected at 
national level (i.e. with representation of stakeholders) to ensure that the national 
representatives are fully briefed on Bologna implementation.  Similarly, the 
consultative members of the Process provide training, information and resources to 
their affiliated national or sub-national organisations, a particularly significant part 
of dissemination. 
 
Thus, the Process can be seen as exhibiting evidence of traditional 
intergovernmental organisation (the privileged role granted to nation states and the 
role of civil servants and Ministers at appropriate junctures), the current European 
reality (the full membership of the European Commission), the developing practice 
in international organisations (involvement of civil society) and a ‘soft law’ 
approach (no formal compliance mechanisms).  However, one particularly 
interesting element of the Bologna Process is that it is not governed by a treaty or 
convention; it has evolved over time and, for example, the BFUG structures were 
not part of the original Communiqué.  Thus, the legal basis is primarily based on 
trust and co-operation rather than on a more conventional intergovernmental 
approach.   
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Bologna Cycles 
 
The impact of Bologna has differed from state to state.  The development of ‘cycles’ 
(initially two cycles, typically three years (bachelor) and two years (master) in 
duration; recently the ‘third cycle’ (doctoral) has been added and discussion on 
postdoctoral research is ongoing) has dominated the perception of Bologna within 
institutions in particular, and the Irish and UK systems have thus enjoyed a position 
of comfortable ignorance of the Process (as distinct from, for example, the 
significant changes to the entire higher education system in Germany).  However, 
the Bologna Process involves much more than cycle-reform, and compliance by 
signatory states is keenly watched by stakeholders in particular, rarely missing an 
opportunity to (directly or though an affiliated organisation) highlight a perceived 
failure to comply with a particular benchmark or target.  Furthermore, the 
‘stocktaking’ element of the Process (where progress is measured and assessed) is 
again a source of peer pressure within the community of nation states.  The results in 
respect of Ireland have broadly been favourable (in that strong compliance is 
reported) although the alternative analyses produced by universities and students 
note deficiencies in the headline measurements.  Probably the most notable 
challenge to be dealt with over the coming years is the status of the Bologna Process 
internationally and whether the international expectation of standardised cycles and 
processes will lead to further changes in Irish higher education.  Given the well-
documented criticisms of the 'one-year Masters degree' familiar in the UK, the 
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elements of Irish HE that duplicate British practice, with the said Masters 
programmes being but one example may be similarly challenged. 
 
Working with Bologna 
 
In Ireland, the National Qualifications Authority of Ireland (NQAI) is charged 
(under the Qualifications Act 1999) with the development of a National Framework 
of Qualifications (NFQ).  This framework has been completed and significant 
progress made on ‘mapping’ existing qualifications to it (the obligations on 
institutions vary; for example, the universities have a statutory obligation to 
cooperate and assist (section 40, Qualifications Act) whereas other institutes seeking 
HETAC validation or delegated authority will automatically work within the 
framework as a condition precedent to approval.  Although the Act does not in any 
section mention or suggest any aspect of the Bologna Process, the Irish framework 
has been aligned (or such alignment is being confirmed) to the Bologna framework 
(EHEA-QF) and also to the EU's European Qualifications Framework (EQF), a non-
binding framework that encompasses all levels of education including higher 
education. 
 
Quality assurance is another example of where the Bologna Process reinforces 
developments at the national level.  As discussed above, a number of institutions of 
varying origin engage in QA activities in Ireland.  Some of these bodies (the IUQB 
and HETAC) have in turn been reviewed externally so that they may be in a position 
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to apply for membership of the EQAR, as under the Standards and Guidelines 
approved in the Communiqués, such review is necessary before an application can 
be accepted.   This is an important verification of how the regulation of a key aspect 
of university reform and development (and QA is more significant than a mere 
checking of procedures, as it is a driver of investment and modernisation in many 
areas) that involves not just the statutory scheme but crucial non-statutory decisions 
(such as the IUQB which was not even contemplated in the Universities Act) and the 
persuasive power of Bologna Process decisions. 
 
Bologna Summary  
 
The Process thus does represent an external constraint on the independent 
development of the Irish higher education system, albeit one freely entered into and 
– it is understood – not a significant burden, at least as compared to other signatory 
states.  Indeed, the latter stages of Bologna Process development (with a focus on 
social cohesion, quality assurance, research and other topics) may be a more 
significant source of regulation or compliance-driven development.  Within Ireland, 
Bologna Process compliance is monitored by a national Bologna Steering Group 
made up of stakeholder representatives (Department of Education as chair, IUA, 
IOTI, DIT, HEA, HETAC, NQAI, USI). 
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4.8  
The influence of European and international measures on Irish higher 
education 
 
The EU is restricted to acting within the competences assigned to it by its Treaties - 
a matter that was at the heart of the recent referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.  Higher 
education is not within Union competence (and the Lisbon Treaty would not change 
this state of affairs), but the Union’s role is derived from Article 149.  Thus, in its 
desire to contribute to quality education, the Commission contains a directorate 
(Education and Training) and commissioner (Figel’) and has a significant work 
programme, while the Treaty sets the Union's role in "encouraging cooperation" and 
"supporting and supplementing" Member State action, focused on issues such as 
mobility, distance education, international cooperation and "incentive measures" that 
do not represent the harmonisation of national laws. 
 
Notably, educational outcomes are a key component of the ‘Lisbon Agenda’ or 
‘Lisbon Growth and Jobs Strategy’.  The Strategy (not to be confused with the 
unrelated Lisbon Treaty) is a classic example of the use of soft law (the open method 
of coordination) where there is neither a legal basis nor political will for full 
processes based on law.  Alongside other areas of employment and social policy that 
are similarly situated, education and research form part of the goals to be met by 
Member States and are the subject of a number of benchmarks.   In addition, 
vocational training is the subject of separate Treaty provisions (Article 150) which 
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provides for a more significant Commission role.  Thus, the level of EU involvement 
can follow an educational/vocational divide; this reflects in part the historic 
treatment of vocational education under pre-Maastrict treaties. 
 
 
The progress reports of the Irish government with regard to the Lisbon Strategy and 
education indicate that while the targets and goals of Lisbon have an influence on 
the content of the debate and policy process on education in Ireland, they are treated 
as one influence among many. The Irish government has for many years highlighted 
the role of education and training in the development of the Irish economy; in 
addition, major reforms in higher education took place during the 1990s, including 
as just some examples the abolition of undergraduate tuition fees for all full-time 
Irish or EU students, the enactment of new university legislation, the evolution of 
the regional technological colleges into ITs, and the planning of the National 
Framework of Qualifications.  However, there has been a recent move towards 
further ‘reform’, in which the influence of Lisbon, especially at the doctoral level, is 
apparent; the meeting of Lisbon targets therefore receives significant attention from 
the Government and stakeholders.  For example, although the Irish target was to see 
gross expenditure on R&D increase to just 2.5% by 2013 (short of the European 
target of 3%), from a 2001 position of 1.4%, this is still considered an ambitious 
target, especially in conjunction with the related ambition to almost double the 
number of researchers in the economy, and is likely to be the subject of pressure in 
the forthcoming Budget.  However, the most recent budgets have included 
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designated funding for academic and non-academic research and the developing 
RGAM incentivises research through allocation formulae.   
 
It should not be forgotten that Ireland also has obligations under international human 
rights law to develop its education system, such as the obligations contained in 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 13 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the latter is 
particularly significant in that the State declares its commitment to the "progressive 
abolition of tuition fees".    However, as the ICESCR lacks a conventional 
enforcement mechanism, and the ECHR's obligations are somewhat distant from 
most aspects of higher education regulation, it is fair to say that even the persuasive 
force of the international legal instruments is not nearly as influential as that of the 
newer (and less legal) Bologna Process and Lisbon Agenda. 
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Education and the Role of Human Capital in Economic Theory  
 
 
The role of education in economic models is rather fuzzy at best. A look at the two 
volumes of the Handbook of the Economics of Education reveals that much of the 
research done in this area is related to empirical studies on issues like teacher 
quality, the effects of school choice, the graduate premium.  
Though much of the analysis done on the statistical side of education is very 
important it must also be considered in light of many caveats. Education statistics 
have only recently (the OECD's Education at a Glance was first published in 1991) 
become comparable across nations (and that is only using instruments that come 
with their own caveats, such as TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematical and 
Science Study) and PISA (OECD Programme for International Student Assessment) 
but also a general problem of paralysis by analysis brought about by these metrics.  
 
The processes of innovation and education are extremely nuanced and statistics 
often are forced into measuring and counting intermediate factors that are not 
immaterial to certain static points in the innovation process but that do ignore 
important internal dynamics and incentives. In the case of education only very 
“academic” types of intelligence are typically measured. This creates an automatic 
hierarchy whereby those with more vocational and technical abilities are placed at 
an evaluative disadvantage and policies aimed at making these students excel 
become afterthoughts. In addition, there is a tendency for policymakers to turn 
statistics into targets. This again creates incentives that distort natural behaviours. 
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This can be by either creating an unhealthy fixation with the metric and over-
allocating resources in the form of time, manpower and money towards improving 
the earmarked statistics or in careful avoidance and management of the metric so as 
not to incur displeasure or further action by policymakers.32  
 
On the theoretical front in economics there are two main theories that deal with 
education and innovation: a macroeconomic one and a microeconomic one. In 
macroeconomics the main impetus for studying education is in the formation of 
human capital, which serves as an endogenous driver of economic growth. Without 
explicitly modelling the educational sector these models, which are associated with 
Nobel Prize winning economist Robert Lucas, assume that there is a one-to-one 
relationship between investment in and the stock/growth rate of human capital. 
Human capital, in turn, creates output in combination with capital goods. In other 
words human knowledge, when applied to machines, factories and other productive 
technologies has a material impact on the productivity of individuals. Growth in 
human capital is an endogenous (systematically internal) driver of economic 
growth.33 So, from this perspective it is clear that higher spending on human capital 
increases to higher growth. This is, however, simply due to assumptions that link 
between human capital and production. A slightly different perspective takes a more 
Schumpeterian (creative destruction) stance. This modification of the endogenous 
                                                 
32
 In the realm of monetary economics this is known as Goodhart's Law. It refers to the near 
instantaneous nullification of a monetary metric for central bank analytical and 
policymaking purposes once it has become known to the wider financial community.  
33
 Prof. Charles Jones in his text Introduction to Economic Growth. (1998) provides a basic 
step-by-step view of education-driven endogenous growth.  
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growth model is characterised by the seminal work of  Phillippe Aghion and Peter 
Howitt.34 This Schumpeterian model does not predict a smooth march of growth, but 
rather argues that growth takes place in fits and starts. The driver of economic 
growth is the number of increases in the productivity of capital and labour. These 
increases are stochastic, meaning that they take place at random intervals. This 
model's policy implication for investment into human capital is that the more 
resources directed towards investment in human capital development and R&D 
increases the expected number of innovations per unit of time. Again, the positive 
link between human capital formation and growth is assumed.  
 
The development of human capital is not necessarily the same as education of 
course. Many forms of knowledge are acquired through practice or are self taught. 
Education policymakers often have difficulties making the development of tacit 
knowledge part of a formal curriculum. In addition formal education structures 
suffer from time lags with respect to advancing technologies. A clear example of this 
was the dominance of typing classes which used typewriters up until the mid-1980s 
even though personal computer technology had made significant inroads and was 
already a ubiquitous tool of modern commercial activities.  
 
In microeconomics the signaling role of education has been emphasised, notably by 
                                                 
34
 Phillippe Aghion has recently published a technical work on what is required to improve 
European universities. The report is published by policy think-tank Bruegel. Aghion, P., M. 
Dewatriopt, C. Hoxby, A. Mas-Colell & A. Sapir. (2008) Higher Aspirations: An Agenda 
for Reforming European Universities. Brussels: Bruegel.  
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Michael Spence.35 In these models one generally abstracts away from any 
productivity-enhancing effect education might have. Instead it is assumed that 
agents are heterogeneous in their productive abilities and knowledge of personal 
productivity is only know to the individual. Education then becomes a device for 
individuals (agents) to signal to employers what is their relative productivity vis-à-
vis the rest of the labour market. The underlying idea is that it is easier for more 
productive agents to obtain a given level of education than it is for less productive 
agents.  
 
The cost of education is of primary concern in this literature. If, namely, education is 
too cheap it is possible that an equilibrium exists where all agents obtain the same 
level of education, implying that high productivity agents can not signal their quality 
anymore. Since wages are a function of known productivity this results in their 
subsequent wages being lower. If, however, the cost of education is sufficiently high, 
only the most productive agents will engage in education, which helps employers 
identify the most productive workers and pay them a wage accordingly. Some more 
recent research along this line of thought has argued that if costs of education are too 
low, “counter-signalling” may take place. This literature typically assumes three 
levels of productivity: low, average, and high. If education is cheap there exists an 
equilibrium where low and average productivity types invest in education, whereas 
high productivity types separate and signal their high productivity by not taking 
                                                 
35
 By signaling it is meant the process by which an item of information about an individual 
(or firm) is publicly imparted to the market in general and is used by that individual to 
differentiate him or herself from the rest of their respective cohort.  
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education. (Some evidence can be seen in US data with respect to university 
students who do not complete courses at the undergraduate and doctoral levels in the 
areas of computer science and engineering. Students elect to leave prior to receiving 
qualification due to  their extremely high abilities in computer programming and 
engineering.) This would lead to a situation where, in equilibrium, employers know 
that people who obtain a high level of education are actually the lower productivity 
ones, whereas the higher productivity types choose not to forgo wages and leave the 
education sector early. This is obviously an undesirable situation and has to be 
seriously taken into account when designing educational policy. 
 
In a more recent National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper 
Robert Lucas argues for a different approach to endogenous growth altogether. The 
central tenant of his argument is that economic growth is driven by the presence of 
ideas and that ideas are scarce (a similar concept occurs in some parts of the 
literature on the economics of innovation, see the work of Susan Scotchmer36). In 
such a set-up growth is driven by ideas. Each individual can, in turn, decide how 
much schooling they get. (It is important to note that in real life decisions many 
cultural and social factors influence the education decision and not solely human 
capital aims.) In this model Lucas  assumes that more education leads to a higher 
probability of an individual having total factor productivity (TFP, a notion that is 
typically thought of in terms of the “Solow Residual” in that it is the residual term 
that accounts for growth once all aspects of capital and basic labour are taken 
                                                 
36
 Scotchmer, Susan. Innovation. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005. 
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account of) improving ideas. In this line of thought it can be argued that the main 
role of education is not so much about meeting standards, but about improving 
people’s skills to develop useful ideas.  
 
The aim of education as a process by which individuals improve their skills so as to 
be better able to articulate and give action to new ideas is linked to the work of 
Andrei Schleifer et al. about productive human capital versus rent-seeking human 
capital.37 This is a theory driven by incentives. If institutions make rent-seeking 
more attractive the most talented people in an economy will not engage in welfare 
enhancing entrepreneurial efforts, but will choose rent-seeking. In the Irish 
economy, institutional habits and structures related to everything from the “points 
race” associated with the Leaving Certificate Established to the regulatory and 
association/union apparatus that enables the protected sectors to retain high margins 
and wages.   
 
These models have important implications for educational policy. They argue that 
educational performance should be measured through an individual’s capacity for 
original thought and entrepreneurship. And here we enter a conundrum that relates to 
our earlier comment on statistics: these qualities are very difficult to measure in a 
standardised way. After all, as soon as quality is measured through specific 
                                                 
37
 Shleifer, Andrei, Kevin Murphy & Robert Vishny. “The Allocation of Talent.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. 106.2: 503-30. See also Shleifer, Andrei, Efi Gildor & Gene 
D'Avolio. “Technology, Information Production, and Market Efficiency.” in Economic 
Policy for the Information Economy. A Symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City,  August 
2002.http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/Technology_paper_final.pdf   
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qualitative measures, educationalists, parents, and children are incentivised to game 
the system, i.e. to become rent-seekers. This results in an environment where 
entrepreneurial activity is stifled and what was at first small instances of rent-
seeking on the part of individuals becomes a culture of using the apparatus of the 
state as method of gaining more protections and influence. This sort of institutional 
practice was what James Galbraith warned of in his book The Predator State (2008) 
where firms and groups no longer engage in market competition but in lobbying 
power eventually creating a malignant lump at the heart of the state and the 
economy that undermines growth and democratic politics as the notion of the 
common good sinks into the miasma of rent-seeking activity. 
 
There is no ready solution to this problem. In a general sense transparency, 
eliminating pre-existing legally based socially detrimental incentives and a process 
of constant reform are the closest prescriptions for remedy. The best we can do for 
now is to be aware of the problems involved and to be frank and open about them. It 
is important not to shy away from confronting vested interests. After all, the 
presence of vested interests is a sign of rent-seeking in the system. If Lucas and 
Schleifer et al. are correct in their modeling of growth this is the one thing one does 
not want to see in an education system. 
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Section 6 
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Innovation as Irreversible Investment and the Consequences of Discounting 
 
6.1 
Introduction 
 
“Innovation” and the “knowledge economy” are currently the talk of the town. 
Elsewhere in this section issues surrounding education and governance are studied 
in relation to innovation. Here we focus attention on a specific element of 
innovation, namely its relation to investment policy.  
 
Innovation can not take place without investment. Investment in people (education 
being of particular importance here), in capital, in natural resources, etc. A 
fundamental feature of innovation is that its outcomes are uncertain. You simply do 
not know whether all the money that is put in actually leads to some positive payoff 
in the end. In fact, you do not know beforehand whether all the inputs will lead to an 
innovation in the first place. The money, time, and effort spent in the process, 
however, can not be recouped. In the jargon, they are “sunk costs”. In other words, 
the investment made in innovative activity is irreversible. 
 
A second important feature of investment is that it can be postponed. It does not 
have to take place today. One can wait and see how the uncertain environment in 
which it takes place develops. An investment that looks bad today, may look very 
promising next year.       
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Together these two features, irreversibility and the ability to postpone, imply that the  
decision-maker essentially has an option to invest; the right, but not the obligation to 
do so. The decision-maker has flexibility in the face of uncertainty. The study of the 
value of investment projects, which puts uncertainty and flexibility centre-stage, is 
called real option theory. The term real option is chosen to distinguish these options 
from the more well-known financial options that are traded on the world’s 
derivatives markets. It alludes to the fact that here we are talking about options on 
investment in the real economy: factories, labs, mortar and bricks; not financial 
claims. 
 
An important factor in determining the value of an investment project is how the 
decision-maker discounts future payoffs. The basic idea behind discounting is that a 
Euro tomorrow does not have the same value to people as a Euro today. Firstly, there 
is the simple issue of time value. A Euro tomorrow can not be spent today and, 
therefore, one has to be recompensed for having to have a degree of patience. This 
patience has a value, which leads to a discounting on tomorrow’s Euro. Secondly, 
there is a risk value. In an uncertain environment it is not sure what the actual 
(relative) value of your Euro tomorrow is. For example, the risk of inflation implies 
that the value of your Euro might be lower tomorrow than it is today. If you are risk-
averse38 this risk implies you will discount the value of tomorrow’s Euro. Finally, 
and especially important in a discussion on innovation, there might be ambiguity. 
                                                 
38
  Roughly speaking one is risk-averse if one prefers a certain EUR 50 to a 50:50 bet 
between EUR 100 and EUR 0.   
 93
Imagine that you are IBM’s CEO Thomas Watson in the early 1940s. At that stage 
you might very well have claimed that “there is a world market for no more than 
five computers ” (the 1943 comment is surrounded with quite a bit of speculation as 
to its veracity but is has entered the cannon of computer science historical quotes). 
Ridiculous as such a claim seems with the benefit of hindsight, IBM’s CEO did not 
have any hindsight to base his claim on. One can perhaps compare innovation to 
walking into a casino without knowing whether the roulette wheel is European or 
American. In other words, the odds are not clear. Economic experiments show time 
and again that people do not like ambiguity: they are ambiguity averse. Ambiguity 
aversion has only quite recently been taken up in axiomatic decision theory (Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1989)), even though informal accounts go back to, at least, Knight 
(1921).   
 
This is also where the all-important distinction between procedural and fundamental 
innovation comes in. Procedural innovation takes place if existing products are 
improved, in whatever shape or form. The risks surrounding the success of such 
innovation can be calculated relatively accurately based on past performance. A 
fundamental innovation is one that opens up new markets, or changes the way 
society operates (the computer, the internet, CD’s are recent examples). The risks 
surrounding the success of such innovations is unknown. To paraphrase Donald 
Rumsfeld, procedural innovation deals with “known unknowns”, whereas 
fundamental innovation lives in the realm of the “unknown unknowns”.39    
                                                 
39
  In actual fact, many fundamental innovations seem to arise as by-products of the quest for 
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The main argument of the section is simple. Innovation takes place, by definition, in 
an environment of ambiguity. The more fundamental the innovation, the more 
ambiguity. The people who take decisions are usually accountable to other people, 
be they shareholders or voters; take the wrong decision and you lose your job. 
(Unfortunately accountability in business and government has become a bit more 
irregular since late 2008 adding a whole new dimension of moral hazard to how 
governments and firms do business.) This makes decision-makers ambiguity averse. 
The more diffuse the lines of accountability, the more ambiguity aversion can be 
expected. The more ambiguity averse the decision-maker, the less investment (and 
therefore innovation) takes place. Thus, one would expect (relatively speaking) to 
see most innovation in single owner firms, less in publicly listed firms, and less 
further in government controlled environments.    
In this chapter, we will use a microeconomic theory to argue this case. 
Specific attention is paid to arguing the link between ambiguity-aversion and 
investment as it is the most opaque link in the argument. It is organised as follows. 
In Section 4.2, the viewpoint of investment as an option is elaborated upon a bit 
further. In Section 4.2.1, the effect of time preferences on investment is discussed, 
whereas in Section 4.2.2, risk aversion is added. These sections are based on 
Thijssen (2009a). In Section 4.2.3, which is based on Thijssen (2009b), ambiguity 
enters the picture. An illustration of the theory is given in Section 4.3, whereas 
Section 4.4 discusses some consequences for policy.  
                                                                                                       
procedural innovations. This is not considered here and is a topic for future research.   
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6.2  
Irreversible Investment as an Option 
 
As is well-known from the literature on financial economics, the flexibility that a 
(financial) option gives has economic value. In fact, this flexibility leads to a 
dichotomy. Imagine one has the option to build a factory for the next generation of 
LCD screens. Obviously, the success of such an enterprise is uncertain and the costs 
of building the factory are high. This gives the decision-maker an incentive to wait 
with the investment decision. This is the value of the option. However, as soon as 
the decision-maker decides to go ahead and build the factory, the option loses all its 
value, since, in effect, the option has been exercises. In return, however, the 
decision-maker gets the future revenues of the factory. The discounted stream of 
future revenues net of the sunk investment costs is called the net-present value 
(NPV). 
 
The decision-maker now faces the following problem: Given the appropriate rate of 
discounting future payoffs, find a time where it is optimal to replace the option value 
of waiting with the actual NPV of investment (i.e. find the optimal time to exercise 
the option). 
 
In the literature this problem is compared to the problem of the valuation of 
American options in (mathematical) finance. An American call option is the right, 
but not the obligation, to buy, at any time (up to and including the time of maturity) 
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a stock at a pre-specified price (the strike price). The problem of finding the optimal 
exercise time is, in fact, a particular application of optimal stopping theory (see 
Shiryaev (1978)).  
 
In most models in real option theory the cash-flows accruing from an investment 
project are assumed to follow a so-called geometric Brownian motion (GBM). This 
is an example of a stochastic process in continuous time. Let Vt denote the cash-flow 
at time t. Then the evolution of Vt depends on two parameters, a trend µV, and a 
volatility σV. The trend measures the expected (exponential) growth rate of the cash-
flows over time, whereas the volatility parameter measures the risk in the evolution 
of V. The geometric Brownian motion is such that at each time t, the value Vt is log-
normally distributed. To be precise, log(Vt) is normally distributed with mean µVt 
and variance σ2Vt (standard deviation σV √t). Note that this specification implies that 
the uncertainty surrounding V gets bigger, the further away in the future one looks. 
To get a feeling for what a GBM looks like, the plot below gives some possible 
sample paths. The smooth line denotes the case if there were no risk. 
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6.2.1 
Risk Neutrality and Option Value 
 
Suppose that the decision-maker is risk neutral, i.e. is indifferent between EUR 50 
for sure or a 50:50 bet on EUR 100 or EUR 0. The problem that now confronts this 
decision-maker is to determine the optimal time at which to exercise the real option 
and invest.  
 
This optimal time depends on two things. Firstly, it depends on the value of V itself. 
This is obvious, since the NPV depends on V. It turns out that there is a specific 
threshold value V*, which tells us that investment should take place as soon as V 
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crosses this value from below. Through time the value of the option then becomes 
dependent on the question how likely it is that V* is going to be reached in future 
given the value of V at that particular time. This implies that the optimal time at 
which investment takes place is not deterministic. Rather, it is a random variable 
itself. This, of course, makes the problem much more complicated from a 
mathematical point of view. 
 
Secondly, the optimal time depends on how the decision-maker discounts the future. 
In other words, it depends on how impatient the decision-maker is. What rate of 
impatience should the decision-maker choose? Given that she is risk neutral, the 
only value that she has to take into account is the pure value of time. A good proxy 
for this can be found by looking at alternative uses of the decision-maker’s money. If 
she were to invest her money in, say government bonds, instead of considering it for 
the investment, then she would get a rate of return (the interest rate) equal to, say r. 
In general, the larger r, the higher the opportunity cost of the investment and – 
therefore – the lower the value of investment.      
  
6.2.2  
Enter Risk Aversion 
 
Let us now assume that, in addition to time preferences, the decision-maker is risk-
averse and – therefore – has specific risk preferences as well. How should this 
change the appropriate discount rate? Again, it pays to look at alternative 
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investments the decision-maker can make. Suppose that there exists an asset (or a 
portfolio of assets) in the financial markets, the risk of which is perfectly correlated 
with the risk in the project. Investing in this asset would give a return, say, µS, and 
involve risk, say, σS. Note that these characteristics are the result of market forces: 
the asset prices result from demand and supply of these assets in the financial 
market. Using this information one can find out how investors in the market value 
the risk. This value is called the market price of risk.  
 
In order to find the market price of risk we need a theory of how prices arise from 
investors’ behaviour. After all, each investor discounts the returns on the bond and 
the risky asset in a particular way. Pooling all these individual discount rates 
together leads to the actual characteristics r, µS, and σS. A standard practice is to 
invoke the principle of no-arbitrage. This principle states that asset prices are 
determined such that they do not admit arbitrage opportunities. An arbitrage 
opportunity is a situation where one can buy a portfolio of assets today at no cost 
and sell it tomorrow at a guaranteed profit. The argument is that such strategies 
should not be possible in equilibrium.   
 
We already know that the rate of time preference is the return on the bond, r. It turns 
out that, under the principle of no-arbitrage, the market price of risk equals hS = (µS-
r)/σS, which is called the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset. The total discount rate can 
now be shown to equal r+hSσV. Most importantly, this discount rate is larger than the 
one in the case of risk neutrality. In addition, it depends explicitly on the volatility of 
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the cash-flow process. This should not come as a surprise since, after all, the 
decision-maker cares about this risk as she is risk-averse.   
 
6.2.3  
The Final Nail in the Coffin? Incomplete Markets and Ambiguity Aversion   
 
An important feature of innovation is that it explores new territory. In the previous 
subsection it was assumed that one could find a risky asset in the financial markets 
whose risk is perfectly correlated with the risk of the cash-flows. This is an 
unrealistic assumption. It seems more worthwhile to assume that an innovation 
relates to some new risk that is not yet traded on financial markets. In such a case 
one can not rely on the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset alone to determine the market 
price of risk. Invoking the no-arbitrage principle here does not help, since there are 
infinitely many market prices of risk that all avoid arbitrage opportunities. In the 
jargon of economists, the investment takes place in incomplete markets. 
 
One way to think about this is to view incomplete markets as a case of ambiguity. 
After all, if all the risk of the project were traded, we would know the correct market 
price of risk. We are, however, ambiguous about what this price could be. As a 
simple case we could say that the price could be anything in the interval [hS-κ,hS+κ], 
for some fixed value κ, which measures the degree of ambiguity.     
 
If we now assume that the decision-maker is ambiguity averse (and there is plenty of 
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experimental evidence to support such an assumption), then it turns out that the 
appropriate discount rate is r+[ρhS+(hS+κ)√(1-ρ2)], where ρ denotes the correlation 
between the risk in the cash-flows and the risky asset. This discount rate, in turn, is 
bigger than the one in the case without ambiguity.  
 
6.3  
An Illustration 
 
In this section we give a numerical illustration of the consequences of these different 
discount rates for several quantities of interest. First, we look at the value of the 
investment project itself. That is, we look at the optimal value, which takes into 
account the optimal time of exercising the option. The result is plotted in the figure 
below. 
 
 102
 
One can see that, as uncertainty increases the value of the project under risk 
neutrality increases. This may seem counter-intuitive, but it is due to the fact that the 
option value increases for higher uncertainty. At the same time, since the decision-
maker is risk-neutral, the NPV of the project does not change. All of this changes if 
the decision-maker is risk-averse. Then the NPV decreases with uncertainty and the 
total value decreases exponentially in the level of uncertainty. Under ambiguity this 
effect is even more pronounced. 
 
Secondly, we look at the probability that investment actually takes place within, say, 
5 years. That is to say, the probability that the optimal investment trigger V* is 
reached within that time frame. The result is shown below. 
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For all three plots one can see that, initially, the probability of investment actually 
increases as uncertainty increases. This is a well-known effect and occurs in many 
such models. The reasoning is as follows: even though higher uncertainty increases 
the optimal investment trigger V* puts a downward pressure on the investment 
probability, the higher volatility means that the probability of bigger upward jumps 
is higher, which puts an upward pressure on the investment probability. For low 
values of uncertainty the latter effect dominates, whereas for bigger values the 
former dominates. Furthermore, one can see that the probability of investment is 
uniformly lower in the case of risk aversion and lower again in the case of 
ambiguity. 
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Finally, we draw another parallel with financial markets. If we view the project as an 
asset traded on the financial market then µV denotes its rate of return. It follows that 
the stock pays a dividend at a rate equal to the discount rate net of the return µV. We 
could also turn this upside down: suppose that we fix the dividend rate, what return 
would investors demand, given the uncertainty in the stock. The plot below shows 
this implicit return. 
  
 
 
As one can see the implied return is constant in the case of risk neutrality, which is 
not surprising since the decision-maker in that case does not care about risk. In the 
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case of risk aversion the rate is increasing in uncertainty: the higher the uncertainty, 
the higher the return an investor needs to be tempted to invest in the asset. The effect 
is even more pronounced in the case of ambiguity. 
 
As should become obvious, ambiguity creates a disincentive for investment. The 
more radical the innovation, the more ambiguity is to be expected. This might go 
some way to explain why we do not see that much investment in fundamental 
innovation: the option value is so big that one hardly ever exercises. It is argued in 
the next section that this effect is particularly present in government-sponsored 
innovation.  
 
6.4  
Consequences for Policy 
 
If a private firm invests, the only people at risk are its shareholders. It is, therefore, 
tantamount that managers, when making investment decisions, have a clear idea 
about the risk attitudes of their shareholders. In a single-ownership firm or a 
partnership this is not an onerous assumption as the owner is usually the manager as 
well.  
 
In a publicly listed firm, however, the problem becomes more acute, since one does 
not know exactly who the investors are. This creates ambiguity in the case of 
decision-making in incomplete markets, which is usually the case with innovative 
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activity. In fact, the more fundamental the innovation, the more incomplete the 
market in which the decision has to be taken and, therefore, the more ambiguity is 
involved. Ambiguity in this case is, thus, due to an information problem. The 
assumption of ambiguity aversion might not seem a bad one in such a case. After all, 
the manager is accountable to the shareholders. If she takes too risky a decision, she 
might lose her job. As we have seen, this ambiguity aversion can be expected to 
dampen innovative activity. 
 
We would argue that this situation is even worse in the case of publicly funded 
investment in innovation. After all, here the managers (i.e. politicians) have to take 
decisions in the interest of all tax payers. If the manager of a publicly listed firm 
faces an information deficit, the manager of a public enterprise faces an information 
desert. Ambiguity, combined with accountability, lead to ambiguity aversion.  The 
nature of the political cycle, and indeed the fraught relationship between elected 
officials and public servants, serves to amplify this problem. 
 
One could argue, therefore, that the ambiguity that is facing a politician is greater 
than that facing a manager of a listed firm, which is greater than that facing a single-
owner firm. And, as we have seen, ambiguity is a disincentive to innovate. This 
would lead to the empirically testable implication that we would expect relatively 
more fundamental innovation from single-owner firms, relatively less from listed 
firms and relatively least from government sponsored innovation. 
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7.1 
Ireland's Need for Homeric Innovation 
 
Perhaps the best way to begin this brief statement on education, innovation and the 
economic future of Ireland is to begin by recounting a story by one of the world's 
first innovators. It is a story that should be familiar to some of our students.  
 
Enchanting, enveloping, ensnaring – thus is the nature of the Sirens' song. First it 
appears enchanting, a spell of beauty. Then it becomes enveloping, filling the mind 
of the mariner with its chords. Finally, it's true purpose is clear, the song is 
ensnaring, drawing the mariner and his craft to their impending doom. Odysseus, 
assured of his inability to withstand their powerful song, orders his men to tie him to 
the mast and fill their ears so they cannot hear any sounds and not follow Odysseus' 
orders to make course for the certain destruction. Their small craft and its captain 
survive but only by the judicious use of caution and ingenuity. They do not succumb 
to the fatal flaw of hubris which would have them ignore the warning they were 
given and pit their will and reason against the enchantresses' song. 
 
This story was told centuries ago by Homer, an innovator who was blind but could 
see into the dark depths of the human condition.  Like Odysseus' small craft upon 
the waves of the Aegean, Ireland and her economy are buffeted by political and 
economic winds and waves with which Fortune intends to batter her small barque. It 
is within this context that one must discuss the question of innovation. Here we will 
briefly introduce some points of view into the policy debate about the drive towards 
the “knowledge economy” in Ireland. The symphony of sounds calling for the 
creation of the knowledge economy has charged the education system with this duty. 
A combination of funding realities, governance failures and a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what constitutes innovation has turned this symphony into 
cacophony.   
 
The policy debate surrounding the drive towards the “knowledge economy” in 
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Ireland is filled with many different agencies and vested interests. The work 
presented in this paper has been an attempt to try to get to the nub of the matter, 
mainly, the consistent policy of placing ad hoc strategies on top of existing and 
deeply rooted systems.  
 
7.2 
The matter of education 
 
Higher education (third level) participation has gone from 5% of school leavers in 
1970/1 to 55% of school leavers in 2006/7.  Let us first look at the numbers. In 2004 
Ireland spent  €7,445 per student, per annum on core educational services. This 
figure reflects the intended expenditure on education. An unofficial estimate 
produced by a university source has less than a quarter of this figure reaching 
classrooms, with the majority being consumed by an internal reallocation 
mechanism. Though this raw number of €7,445 places Ireland on a par with 
universities in Finland and with most state colleges in the United States, actual 
educational expenditure is much lower.  When research expenditure is included in 
the figure, Ireland spends €10,211 per student, per annum in 2004. This compares 
with a per student, per annum figure of approximately €5,000 in 1992/3, before the 
advent of SFI and the other research funding bodies. Despite talk of a funding 
shortfall, the gross figure of income for the universities has increased considerably 
and rapidly. TCD’s public accounting statements illustrate an income increase of 
85.9% between 2000 and 2005. Much of this increase was the result of growing 
student numbers and research income. A caveat must always be added to any 
discussion of these numbers that policymakers and practitioners fall into the trap of 
equating inputs with outputs]  
 
The argument that the universities are underfunded is valid on one level. The 
funding levels of Irish third level education are insufficient if the sector is expected 
to educate almost 200,000 students, act as a centre of internationally renowned 
research and development, and serve as custodian of teacher training, pilotman of 
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innovation and priest of the knowledge economy. There would be no exchequer 
capable of funding organisations with so many disparate purposes. Trinity College 
Dublin has no less than 94 strategic planning goals for the time between 2009-2014. 
This planning has also not taken into account the current acute and potentially 
protracted economic downturn and consequential reduction in funds available from 
the public exchequer. Trinity College alone aims to have a Ph.D. cohort of 2000 
students by 2013/14 and “deliver” 50% of Ireland's Fourth Level SSTI target in 
conjunction with the TCD-UCD Innovation Alliance.  
 
The TCD-UCD Innovation Alliance is a clear example of where the aspirations of 
policymakers reaches the limits of credulity even to their peers.  In an October 2009 
interview in Public Affairs Ireland DCU President Ferdinand von Prondzynski 
outlined his concerns that the promises for employment growth made by the alliance 
were unobtainable: 
 
“Professor Von Prondzynski was also critical of some of the promises made around 
the alliance. 'The big concern that I would have with the Trinity-UCD alliance is that 
they made one or two promises that they will not be able to keep. In particular, that 
they will create 30,000 jobs: they will not create 30,000 jobs, and in fact they will be 
very lucky if they create 300 jobs. It is a mistake for them to have said that, because 
it generates an expectation of what all universities can do, which is simply wrong. If 
you are commercialising research, which is what this is based around, the likelihood 
of that leading to significant commercial benefits is subject to various risks, and 
probably more than half of what you commercialise will not make it to anything. 
Those that do, won’t generate those benefits for some time.'”40  
 
The argument fails when one connects higher education directly to economic 
growth.  Ireland's university sector, unlike the rest of Western Europe, did not slowly 
evolve and change prior to World War II and did not have a dramatic increase in the 
higher education student population until 25 years after Europe and the United 
States. Ireland was also late in providing for free secondary education, with it being 
introduced in 1968. The beneficial effects of free secondary education and the 
                                                 
40
 Smyth, T. (2009) “A Time of Uncertainty in Third Level Education” Public Affairs Ireland. 
No. 62: 1-2, 2. 
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expansion of the third level sector on the Irish economy, as outlined in the economic 
works of former Taoiseach Garrett FitzGerald and Prof. John FitzGerald of the 
ESRI, are clear but education does not tell the entire story of Ireland's “long boom” 
from the early 1990s to late 2007.  
 
The Government's copper-fastened link between education and innovation is seen in 
the Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation 2006-2013. The doubling the 
number of Ph.D.s graduating every year was seen as the key. The Higher Education 
Authority, in its recent strategic plan, boasts of how this goal of almost 1,300 Ph.D.s 
is within sight. Somehow, activity has been confused with achievement. In the 
United States, what is considered to be the birthplace of the “knowledge economy”, 
some 30% of Ph.D. graduates are unemployed upon exit from their programmes and 
of those who are employed, only 27% are working in industry or are self-employed, 
with the remaining persons working in academe, government or what the US 
National Science Foundation refers to as “other”, this coming from a system where 
the 2004 Eurostat figure for government expenditure on research & development 
amounted to €143,439.93 million, whereas Ireland spends €1,840.40 million.   
 
This is still a country that invests a comparatively low level (about €5,500 in 2006) 
in primary education, with 25 students to a class, making Ireland one of the highest 
student-teacher ratio holders in the EU. In an education system where 28% of 
primary teachers who see themselves as poorly prepared for teaching mathematics, 
the key issue is how to recapture Ireland's ability to compete on a human capital 
basis. Research conducted by the NCCA in 2007 illustrated that the mathematical 
ability of students entering secondary education are predictive of Junior Certificate 
results and subsequently Leaving Certificate results.  
 
The failure of policymakers to see the learning and policy outcomes of education 
from the primary level up to and  beyond third level has been a large part of why 
IBEC and others have filled the pages of newspapers and the time on the airwaves 
with concern about 5,000 students failing mathematics and the subsequent focus of 
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students on law and medicine and not science, mathematics or engineering. 
 
Short-term policy objectives and a lack of focus on deep knowledge and 
understanding has been the objective of the top down approach to education. Human 
capital competitiveness is no longer about deep knowledge and the inherent 
flexibility it brings but a mechanical and simplistic model that sees an Ireland where 
77% of school leavers attend university and 1,300 doctorates are awarded per 
annum. In the United States, only 35% of the population attends university and on a 
population basis graduates less than half the number of Ph.D.s per annum.  At the 
level of researchers per 10,000 persons, Ireland has 51, compared to the Netherlands' 
50 and the UK's 55, putting Ireland on a par with its European partners but this 
metric is not an indicator of success. The USA has 81 researchers per 10,000 persons 
but 47.3% of those unemployed in the US have a third level education, compared to 
only 24% in Ireland, 14.6% in the UK and 12.4% in the Netherlands. The linkages 
between education and economic are not as clear-cut as policymakers would like to 
indicate.  
 
The quote below is from Lionel Robbins, the London School of Economics 
professor that chaired the famous Robbins Report (also known as the Report of the 
Committee on Higher Education) that resulted in the great expansion of British 
higher education in the 1970s and 80s. Robbins' own lack of certainty between 
higher education and economic growth is important to note.  
 
“I simply cannot take seriously any attempt to trace any obvious correlation between 
rates of growth of gross national product – however this nebulous quantity is 
measured – and the proportion of the relevant age-groups receiving higher 
education. Needless to say there must be some correlation between the proportion of 
highly trained engineers and the prevalence of successful industry attending their 
operations. It would not be absurd to attempt to establish some connection between 
the proportion of competently educated doctors and the improvement of health. But 
I should be greatly surprised if, outside specific vocational correlations of this sort, 
anything much wider and tangible could be found; the variables are so numerous 
and the connections are often so indirect. ...There are indeed such considerable 
variations, both in time and place, between the effectiveness of the organisation of 
higher education that more quantitative comparisons must be open to considerable 
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question. Moreover the causes of variation in productivity are themselves so various 
that any attempt to isolate the influence through time of any one factor must be the 
subject of serious doubt. And considerations of this sort apply mutatis mutandis to 
scholarship and research. Many sophisticated investigations have been directed to 
the establishment of tangible connection of the kind I have been discussing. But I 
must confess that, interesting as they may be, in the outcome they leave me 
completely unconvinced; and I would regard their use in discussions of public policy 
regarding higher education in general as specious.”41 
 
In general, this myth of the knowledge economy is the most pernicious of all those 
perpetrated by politicians and policymakers since it offers the most hope but delivers 
the greatest uncertainty. 
 
 
Much of what was stated above is not purely about finances and high theory, it also 
relates largely to the governance and a misguided understanding of innovation. 
Fintan O'Toole stated in his recent article in the Irish Times, Ireland's “knowledge 
economy”, that the “knowledge society” is part of this illusion. Engineering, 
computer science, mathematics and science in general are not being embraced by 
students. This can be partly explained by some of the issues mentioned by Mr.  
O'Toole, but the economist may find the cause in something much more prosaic – 
money.  At present, engineering, computer science and many of  the hard sciences do 
not  appear to provide incomes that will allow people to enter the bottom rung of 
property ladder. Property, the boom that has now turned to bust, has skewed many 
elements of the market but the blame does not entirely sit with that sector's 
voracious consumption of capital and tendency towards rent-seeking (acquisition of 
excessive profits through manipulation of institutions and policies).  
 
The professions and the medical sector, protected by the law and lobby groups 
present a surer pathway to high income to those sitting the Leaving Cert this year 
and to their parents. These students do not want to become innovators, they want to 
become rent-seekers, acquiring wealth through a combination of protectionism and 
political activity. There are fortunes to be made in financial mathematics, 
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cryptography, artificial intelligence, new business practices and cultural activities 
but it is safer to be a doctor, a lawyer, a nurse or to gain entry into some other 
protected sector of Ireland's economy; the product of an economy now denuded of 
its competitiveness and saddled with massive levels of private debt as a result of the 
unholy cocktail of rent-seeking and property madness.   
 
Some see the solution to the problems of education and the dominance of the 
professions simplistically, where competition is the sole solution. There is indeed a 
need for competition but it needs to be in combination with control and regulation; it 
is a failure of imagination across public and private spheres that we continue to see 
the professions as so important.  Put simply,  Government refuses to regulate and 
steer, the courts refuse to interfere, and the public refuse to challenge or complain. 
 
The Leaving Certificate is another example of where governance needs to be held to 
account. There remains a general lack of reform - we still have much the same exam 
as we had 30 years ago (cosmetic changes aside) and, with the exception of 
medicine and some access programmes, the CAO system is similarly unchanging. 
Higher education still penalizes part-time study and has virtually no serious distance 
learning. Ireland’s higher education sector still lags 25 years behind most of the 
planet. 
 
Ireland's “knowledge economy” may be the myth that Mr. O'Toole rightly makes it 
out to be but much of that blame lies not with the government but with the polity, 
Cassius' remonstrance rings as true today as in ancient Rome: The fault dear Brutus 
lies not in our stars but in ourselves.  
 
7.3 
The misguided notion of innovation 
 
Many of the problems in the education sector are repeated in the area of research and 
development in Ireland. Ireland has consistently confused matters of risk and 
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uncertainty. Risk deals with known unknowns, whereas uncertainty deals with 
unknown unknowns. Risk can be managed, ambiguity cannot. The Government's 
fear of uncertainty has caused it to support policies that actually stifle innovation. 
This is due to a failure to see the differences between inputs and outputs, resulting in 
input consumption being seen as a sign of success. The secondary response to this 
situation is to arrange for government agency control, resulting in its own 
complications for innovation.   
 
Education and research, much like heath care, are insatiable consumers of funding, 
partly because expenditure is considered a proxy for quality. At a local level, this 
leads to the “Matthew Effect”, where those that have been given more grant income 
will be rewarded with yet more money with a high probability.  
 
Let us look at this question from the point of view of policymakers who are making 
decisions from international league tables.  Expenditure on research becomes a 
proxy for quality, and in what is seen as an international competitiveness “arms 
race” the level of general expenditure on research and development is seen as a 
proxy for economic vibrancy and efficiency. This interpretation of how economic 
competitiveness is maintained has been the crux of Ireland's innovation strategy.  
 
Patents have been also used a metric of the quality and depth of the knowledge 
economy. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act was intended to kick-start the American 
economy this way. University patenting had exploded a few years before but this 
created incentives to measure success by the number of patents. The impact has been 
to find gainful employment for the majority of US patent lawyers (44% in the top 20 
US universities) and to increase the cost of research due to licensing fees. It was a 
point of law, not government policy, which enabled the patenting of life in Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty (447 U.S. 303) [1980] and kick-started the biotechnology industry.  
The impact of a policymaking approach that confuses inputs with outputs is to 
blindly increase education expenditure to non-optimal levels, in so far as spending 
too much of GDP on third level education and research (the creation of the so-called 
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“Fourth Level”, a descriptive/marketing term for postgraduate study that does not 
exist outside of the Republic of Ireland) and ignoring the primary and secondary 
sectors, where expenditure arguably has a higher economic and social return.  
 
7.4 
The problem of the law and governance 
 
Let us close by combining the problems of governance with a confused concept of 
innovation. We currently have a plethora of separate agencies regulating our 
economy.  Many of these agencies are orientated towards education, some towards 
regulation, such as Comreg, others are major service providers, such as the HSE. All 
of these organisations exist within an antiquated system of administrative law, that 
does not allow the citizen, firm or entrepreneur a clear set of structures by which to 
engage with these agencies and call them to account.  These bodies have been set up 
to deal with particular tasks that central government used to do, others encouraged 
by European law requiring “independent” regulation, others because existing 
departments didn't have the skills or were created by ministerial order.  There is also 
a parallel track of hybrid bodies, such as the CAO, which while legally a private 
company owned by the universities (who are themselves of peculiar legal status) 
carries out “functions” that interact with the functions of the State. 
 
At the moment the Government has been talking about cutting back on the number 
of bodies as a cost-saving measure.  The overall number of agencies is not the 
problem – it is how they relate to good governance.  It is quite difficult for a citizen 
to deal with the State, but it is often more difficult when dealing with an 
“independent” agency.  The objective is to defuse the old-fashioned parish pump 
politics. That these agencies are designed not to operate within the realm of the 
openly political is noble but it has its dangers (democratic control, lack of 
accountability, industry capture to name a few). A century ago US Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said that sunlight remains the greatest disinfectant. 
Transparent institutions are by their very nature accountable. Even the tools 
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designed to allow public or media participation and scrutiny have a very uneven 
application across the bodies – you cannot say for certain whether a body is 
Freedom of Information Act (FOI)-applicable without looking it up and there seems 
to be no rule of thumb (the question is whether it is on an exclusive list contained in 
regulations, there is no general “public functions” test so it is never legally possible 
to FOI a body that is not explicitly on the list).    
 
Judicial review is similarly difficult – the system of Irish administrative law rests 
upon the ability to seek judicial review of a decision but that is limited by judicial 
self-restraint (deference) which does seem to be applied very generously in the case 
of agencies.  The process itself is expensive and the outcomes of proceedings are 
subject to great uncertainty. 
 
There is no general pattern to Irish quangos. This presents difficulties for the citizen 
or the entrepreneur to know how to deal with the agencies when every agency has 
different procedures, governing bodies, and appeal mechanisms.  There exists at 
present no unified rule-making system as in the US, and no formal collation of 
agency decisions, this again it varies from body to body. 
 
Ireland has created an environment that stifles innovation, by creating a legal 
structure where education (HEA, HETAC, FETAC, FAS, CAO, NCCA), innovation 
(IRCHSS, IRCSET, SFI, IDA, HRB, Enterprise Ireland, Forfas) and many other 
aspects of our lives (Comreg, HSE, etc) are controlled by obscure agencies. This 
environment does not encourage the entrepreneur or the innovator. Instead, it 
rewards the rent-seeker who desires to “work the system” above all other objectives. 
Once again we return to Cassius' rebuke.  
 
So what is to be made of this present situation?  Two stories from Classical Greece 
and Rome were woven into this brief narrative.  The stories have an important 
lessons for policymakers today. The song of the knowledge economy is melodious 
and clear but it can trap those unwilling to acknowledge its potential dangers. 
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Education is important to the Irish economy but it has little to offer if investments 
are made on the basis of short-term objectives where inputs are confused for outputs 
and activity is confused for achievement. Finances may be one aspect of this policy 
debate but a deeper and more important one is the issue of governance. Governance 
skews resource allocation, it distorts incentives, it can destroy innovation and 
encourage rent-seeking. The current superstructure of the education/innovation 
system in Ireland suffers from a governance problem, a problem that seems 
pervasive throughout the entire political and economic system. If the 1980s were 
about getting Ireland's fiscal house in order, the 2010s will be about getting the 
institutional house (and from the exchequer borrowing requirement figures for 2009 
and 2010 once again getting its fiscal house) in order. Institutional structures and 
incentives will be partly to blame for the failure of the establishment of a knowledge 
economy in Ireland. Policymakers and the polity in general must learn that the fault 
lies not in our stars but in ourselves.  In summation Odysseus and Cassius have 
important lessons for us, since both remind us in different ways not to succumb to 
hubris. Ireland cannot control its entire destiny but it can ensure that the ground is 
prepared through measured and careful public investment in education and a 
supportive political and legal system, then and only then will Ireland successfully 
absorb investment and have an innovative economy. Such a policy option is not 
quick or easy. Neither was Odysseus' journey home – but it was worth the effort.  
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